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Worker Motivation, Wages, and Bilateral Market Power in Nonunion Labor Markets

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The terms of market exchange can, under certain conditions, even in competitive markets, reflect underlying power relationships. Bilateral market power exists in employment relationships whenever both workers and employers benefit from maintaining their association: whenever the value of the employment relationship exceeds the value of the next best alternative for both parties simultaneously. This paper develops a widely applicable model of bilateral market power in employment relationships along with some of its implications.
creator Ferguson, William D.
Title Worker Motivation, Wages, and Bilateral Market Power in Nonunion Labor Markets
supporting host Grinnell College. Economics Department.
Index Date 2004
Publisher Palgrave Macmillan Journals
Type of Resource text
Genre article, post-print
Digital Origin born digital
Extent 22 pages
Media Type application/pdf
citation/reference Ferguson, William D. “Worker Motivation, Wages, and Bilateral Market Power in Nonunion Labor Markets,” Eastern Economic Journal, 30 (4), Fall 2004, 527-547. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40326146
Date Issued Fall 2004
Language English
Topic Incentives in industry
Topic Wages
Topic Employee motivation
Related Item Faculty Scholarship
Identifier (local) grinnell:11659
Access Condition Copyright to this work is held by the author(s), in accordance with United States copyright law (USC 17). Readers of this work have certain rights as defined by the law, including but not limited to fair use (17 USC 107 et seq.).
Identifier (hdl) http://hdl.handle.net/11084/11659
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