

The Mosque as a “School of Democracy”: Civic Skill Opportunity and Houses of Worship in Indonesia

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Abstract

This paper examines the potential role of houses of worship as institutions where individuals can acquire civic skills that can be deployed for political participation in the world’s largest Muslim-majority democracy: Indonesia. Drawing on participant observation of almost 300 worship and non-worship gatherings in seven Muslim, Protestant, and Catholic religious communities in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, as well as interviews with members of these communities, this paper investigates two key questions: 1) what opportunities exist for members of Indonesian worship communities to develop and practice the civic skills that are believed to facilitate political participation? and 2) does civic skill opportunity vary across religious denominations? The study introduces an original Civic Skill Opportunity scale, which, when tested, shows that mosques are less likely to develop the civic skills among their worshippers than are churches. These denominational differences can be explained by a house of worship’s embeddedness in a confessional hierarchy, style of worship, and the relative size of the religious denomination. This study’s findings could have important implications regarding how we think about religion in Southeast Asia, especially Islam, as an impediment or incubator of democracy.

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INTRODUCTION¹

In the aftermath of recent Islamist terror attacks in Paris and Brussels, public attention is focused again on the question of terrorist recruitment. Media coverage of the topic emphasizes the potential role of the mosque as the source of ideological radicalization and recruitment into terrorist cells. Empirical studies examining radicalization and terrorist recruitment are limited due to lack of available, reliable data, yet those that do exist (Forest (ed.), 2006; Gottschalk and Gottschalk, 2004) have not found the mosque to be a reliable radicalizing agent. In a separate line of scholarship, literature on advanced Western democracies has long emphasized the important role that churches can play in preparing individuals to participate in democracy through the practice of voluntarism and community building in their worship life (de Tocqueville, 1988). Recent research on Indonesia (Lussier, forthcoming 2016) finds that individuals—both Muslims and Christians—who are more active in religious practice are more politically engaged as well. A common mechanism that links houses of worship to political involvement is the role that these institutions can play in helping active worshippers acquire skills that can be transferred to a political domain.

This paper examines the role of houses of worship in fostering opportunities for individuals to develop civic skills that could be applied to political participation in democratic settings. Based on the observation of nearly 300 specific events in seven different houses of worship in the city of Yogyakarta, Indonesia, this paper explores two questions. First, how are the functions of houses of worship organized? More specifically, are houses of worship organized in ways that present opportunities for worshippers to develop and practice civic skills that could potentially transfer to political life? Second, what, if any variation do we see across religious denominations?

The following analysis unfolds over four sections. I first provide an overview of the theoretical framework in which this study is situated. I then describe the case of Yogyakarta, Indonesia and the specific houses of worship under examination. This section is followed by an analysis of the methodology employed and a presentation of the findings. In particular, I develop a Civic Skill Opportunity scale and score the seven test cases on the scale. The final section of the paper offers a preliminary explanation for the variation in civic skill opportunities observed across cases.

HOUSES OF WORSHIP AND CIVIC SKILLS

Most research on the role of houses of worship in mobilizing political action have focused on predominantly Christian countries that are either democracies or attempting democratic transitions (Campbell, 2004; Greenberg, 2000; Johnston and Figa, 1988; McDaniel, 2008; Tate, 1993). More specifically, scholars have extensively studied the relationship between participation in regular religious services and engagement in civic and political life in the United States (Johnson & Tamney, 1986; Lege and Kellstedt, 1993; Morris, 1984; Putnam & Campbell, 2010; and Wald, 1992). Within this broad body of work, several hypotheses about the role of churches in fostering political action have found empirical support. First, churches provide a forum where individuals can be exposed to political messages, either through information shared by a church leader from

¹ The analysis presented in this paper would not have been possible without the work of several individuals. Nuki Mayasari, Franciscus Chrismanto Simamora, and Anwar Masduki Azzam conducted participant observation and wrote field reports along with me in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Jackson Blais and Caitlin Scaife assisted me in coding and categorizing more than 500 pages of field notes to build a database of the observation reports. I am grateful to each of these individuals for their important contributions to data generation and analysis.

the pulpit or more informally in conversation with other congregants. Second, churches are regularly embedded in a greater community and can serve as an access or entry point for congregants to interact more broadly with other local institutions—including those involved in political causes. Similarly, participation in church life expands individuals' social networks, thereby increasing the likelihood that they may be invited to participate in political activities through this network. A final argument is that engagement in church life can help individuals develop skills that they can deploy to be more effective political participants. This last point, the role of skill development, is the focus of the current study.

In *Voice and Equality* (1995), Verba, Schlozman, and Brady define civic skills as “the communications and organizational abilities that allow citizens to use time and money effectively in political life” (p. 304). The authors operationalize this concept by gathering data on whether individual survey respondents had, within the last six months: written a letter, gone to a meeting where they took part in making decisions, planned or chaired a meeting, or given a presentation or speech (p. 311). They assert that civic skills are acquired throughout one's life, but are particularly developed in school, which helps to explain the strong, robust correlation between education and political activism. For adults, the workplace provides the most common nonpolitical setting where one can acquire and practice civic skills, but churches and other voluntary associations can also provide opportunities for skill development. Civic skills are individual-level characteristics; they cannot be measured at an institutional level. Yet, opportunities to develop and practice civic skills are not constant across institutional settings. For example, an individual who works at a law office will encounter greater opportunities to organize meetings, make presentations, and participate in deliberations than will an individual working on an assembly line. Consequently, a law office offers more civic skill opportunities than a meat processing plant. Similarly, in the realm of voluntary associations, individuals participating in the local parents-teachers association are more likely to draw on civic skills than individuals playing in a softball league. It is plausible that similar variation in opportunities might exist across different houses of worship.

Verba, Schlozman, and Brady noted that religious institutions provide civic skill-building opportunities to those who have not acquired these skills through education or their occupation. Moreover, they also found that Protestant congregations tended to offer greater possibilities for the acquisition of civic skills compared to Catholic parishes, thereby identifying denominational effects. Other scholars have also explored this connection between engagement in religious associations and political participation, but most empirical analyses have focused on the United States, whose population is predominantly Protestant and Catholic. The few studies that have examined the relationship between participation in religious groups and political life outside the U.S. have looked at predominantly Christian countries as well (for example, Uslander, 2002, and Patterson, 2005).

Contrary to this scholarly focus on churches, mosques are rarely the subject of study in work examining Islam and political mobilization. In addition, the few social scientific studies that do investigate the mosque as a primary unit of analysis examine mosques in Muslim minority countries (Astor 2012; Jamal, 2005). While the relationship between Islam and a variety of political outcomes—including political openness, inequality, political violence, and terrorism—is of great interest to political scientists, the particular role of the mosque in facilitating political attitudes or behaviors among Muslims is often overlooked. Rather, much of the work examining linkages between Islam and political outcomes has focused primarily on the role of religious organizations and political parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, Ennahda in Tunisia, and the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, or the

influence of specific religious leaders, such as the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran and Abdurrahman Wahid in Indonesia. The role of average Muslims, presumably the individuals who might lend their support to religious parties or movements, or who will comprise the predominant electorate in Muslim-majority countries, is both undertheorized and largely unexamined.

Lussier (forthcoming 2016) observed many of the same patterns in engagement in religious associations and political participation in Muslim-majority Indonesia that Verba, Scholzman, and Brady identified in the United States. Lussier's findings suggest that the content of religious teachings is not what inspires political participation, but rather that it is the civic skills engendered by religious practice and the social bonds created by organized religion that fosters conditions for political recruitment.

We have little reason, *a priori*, to believe that mosques might not serve a similar role to churches in providing opportunities to cultivate and practice civic skills in Muslim-majority countries. Mosques, like churches, serve the primary role of providing a space for worship. Similarly, communities of worshippers develop around mosques as they do around churches, fostering social networks and linkages within a broader community. While previous studies have identified differences between Catholic and Protestant congregations with regard to their role in facilitating political participation, these variations are largely believed to be a consequence of differences in organizational structure rather than doctrine. If religious doctrine is generally peripheral to the link between engagement in a religious community and civic skill acquisition, considering mosques and churches together within the broader concept of houses of worship could help advance our understanding of the prospects and limitations of democratization within Muslim-majority contexts.

CASE SELECTION: YOGYAKARTA, INDONESIA

Indonesia is a logical place to study the role of houses of worship in cultivating civic skills. The country is predominantly Muslim with a sizeable Christian minority, making it possible to compare the differences in civic skill potential across denominations within the same polity. The Indonesian constitution officially recognizes six religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. According to the 2010 census, 87.2 percent of Indonesians identified as Muslim, 7 percent as Protestant, 2.9 percent as Catholic, 1.7 percent as Hindu, 0.7 percent as Buddhist, and 0.05 percent as Confucian.

Indonesia is an extremely heterogeneous country, comprising hundreds of ethnicities and distinct language groups across more than 1,000 inhabited islands. Administratively, Indonesia is organized into thirty-three different provinces that range in population size from under one million (West Papua) to more than 43 million (West Java). Adherents of different religions are not distributed uniformly across the country. For example, more than 3.2 million of Indonesia's four million Hindus reside on the island of Bali. Approximately half of Indonesia's Catholics are concentrated in two provinces: East Nusa Tenggara and West Kalimantan. On the whole, however, Muslims comprise the majority of religious adherents in all but five Indonesian provinces.² Moreover, adherents of all other religious traditions are present in all Muslim-majority regions, with Christians comprising the most substantial minority groups.

² According to the 2010 Census, Hinduism is the majority religion in Bali, Catholicism is the majority religion in East Nusa Tenggara, and Protestantism is the majority religion in North Sulawesi, West Papua, and Papua.

Because the unit of analysis in the present study is houses of worship, I sought to select worship communities within the same local region in order to ensure that differences observed across denominations were not a result of possible variations in local political context. By holding political context constant, I am confident that variation I see among level of activism is due to characteristics endogenous to the organization of houses of worship. I selected the city of Yogyakarta as the primary research location. Yogyakarta is part of the province named the Special Administrative Region of Yogyakarta, which comprises the city of Yogyakarta together with four other districts.³ This province is located in the central part of Indonesia's most populous island, Java, and is predominantly ethnic Javanese, the largest ethnic group in Indonesia.

Yogyakarta (also known to Indonesians as "Yogya") boasts three particular attributes that make it a good fit for the present study. First, the city of Yogyakarta largely reflects the religious composition of Indonesia as a whole, with slightly higher percentages of Christians. According to the regional Ministry of Religion's 2013 statistics, the city's population is 82.4 percent Muslim, 10.6 percent Catholic, and 6.5 percent Protestant (Kementerian Agama DIY, September 2013). Second, while Yogyakarta is known as a center of traditional Central Javanese culture, the city is also a well-regarded educational center in Indonesia, boasting both the oldest Indonesian university, the University of Gadjah Mada, as well as a number of other public and private institutes of higher learning—including a Protestant university, a Catholic university, and several Islamic universities. Consequently, a large number of non-Javanese Indonesians are attracted to the city for study and work, contributing to meaningful ethnic and religious pluralism. Lastly, Yogyakarta has a long history of religious tolerance that has facilitated open religious practice and low levels of religious politicization. Consequently, most religious groups have been able to establish strong worship communities, ensuring that any variation I observed across denominations would not likely be a consequence of religious suppression of a particular group.

Islamic religious practice in Yogyakarta comprises characteristics that reflect both the city's location in Central Java, as well its role as a destination for Muslims from across the archipelago. The modernist Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, was founded in Yogyakarta in 1912, and Muhammadiyah remains a strong, visible presence in the city, particularly in the areas south of the city's central palace. Muhammadiyah holds the property deeds of several mosques, but its presence is more apparent in the schools and hospitals it sponsors in the city. However, it would be incorrect to describe Islamic practice in Yogyakarta as dominated by Muhammadiyah-influenced traditions or people. Rather, a multitude of different perspectives and practices are present in the city. Compared to the visible influence of Muhammadiyah, the presence of Nadhlatul Ulama (NU)—Indonesia's largest Muslim organization, which is strongest in the East Java province—is much weaker in Yogyakarta. NU's strongest presence is felt in the village of Mlangi, which is located a short distance from Yogyakarta in the neighboring district of Sleman. Mlangi is home to numerous traditional Islamic schools (*pesantran*), and several Islamic clerics who serve mosques in the city of Yogyakarta reside and teach in Mlangi. Other *pesantran* organized by NU members are located throughout Yogya, however their impact on surrounding worship communities appears to be limited. Nevertheless, elements of NU worship traditions are visible throughout mosques in Yogyakarta, and religious scholars coming from the NU tradition regularly preach and teach in Yogyakarta's worship communities.

³ According to the 2010 Census, the city of Yogyakarta had a population of 388,627. The Special Administrative Region of Yogyakarta had a population of 3.4 million. The census further identified that 9.5 percent of the regional population were interprovincial migrants.

As of September 2013, there were 494 mosques in Yogyakarta (Ministry of Religion, Special Administrative Region of Yogyakarta). Most mosques in Yogyakarta cannot be divided into a clear categorization of Muhammadiyah and NU traditions. Outside of the communities in which there is a visible concentration of Muhammadiyah members or supporters, most mosques lack a pure characterization with regard to specific strains of religious tradition. Unlike churches, most mosques do not have one religious cleric who oversees religious life at the house of worship. Rather, a large number of the city's mosques operate with a mix of traditions. As the city grows and its demography changes, worshippers at the same mosque may find themselves bringing different heritages to the worship space. In Yogya, the individuals in a mosque community responsible for organizing Friday prayers (the most significant weekly religious obligation in Islam) and Koranic study usually invite a broad range of Islamic scholars and preachers to visit their communities. Thus, in the course of a month, the same mosque might have clerics representing Muhammadiyah, NU, and Salafist traditions adopted from the Middle East, as well as speakers who were raised and educated in positions that fall outside of these different strands of Islam.

Another important characteristic of Islamic worship practice in Yogyakarta is the broad range of size of mosque and worship communities. There are a number of large, well-established mosques that boast extensive programming and a large number of worshippers. One such example is the national Syuhada Mosque, which was built to serve as a living memorial to Indonesians who had died in the country's revolution. The mosque is located near the city center, has an educational mission, and engages in a variety of volunteer outreach programs throughout the city. Yet, there are also a number of small, neighborhood-level mosques that seek to serve the basic worship needs of residents in a district geographic area.

The Christian communities of Yogyakarta also exhibit considerable diversity. According to the regional Ministry of Religion, there are forty-five Protestant congregations in Yogyakarta, representing twenty-four different Protestant denominations. The largest mainline denomination is the Christian Church of Java (*Gereja Kristen Jawa*, henceforth GKJ), which has eight churches in the city. The GKJ is a Presbyterian denomination and has adopted the primary organizational structure of Presbyterian churches in Europe. The Pentecostal Church of Indonesia is the largest evangelical denomination, housing five churches in Yogyakarta. The city also has seven Catholic parishes.

Table 1 provides a breakdown of the number of houses of worship and adherents of Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism in Yogyakarta. Several points of information from this table are noteworthy. First, there is a much larger number of mosques than churches in the city. While this fact is unsurprising given the overall size of the Muslim population, one potentially important consequence is that Muslims are likely to be in closer proximity to their houses of worship than are Christians. Such proximity should ease participation in the life of a worship community and help facilitate more regular communication between members of the mosque community. Second, the ratio of houses of worship to adherents displays a dramatic difference between Catholics and other adherents. While the ratio of houses of worship to adherents is similar between Muslims and Protestants, ranging between 588 and 679 worshippers to each religious community, the ratio for Catholics is 6,171 worshippers to a single parish. We should expect that the size of Catholic worship communities will be much larger, which will likely contribute to a greater depersonalization of worshippers' experience as they are much less likely to know each other well.

Table 1: Total Number of Houses of Worship and Adherents in City of Yogyakarta

<i>Religion</i>	# of Houses of Worship (Mosques and Churches)	# of Adherents	Ratio of Houses of Worship to Adherents
Islam	494	335,389	1: 679
Catholicism	7	43,196	1: 6,171
Protestantism	45	26,478	1: 588

Ministry of Religion for the Special Region of Yogyakarta, September 2013

In order to develop a research plan that would capture the breadth of worship experiences in Yogyakarta while also ensuring representation of dominant trends, I selected seven houses of worship as sites for extensive participant observation. I received permission from the appropriate religious authorities in all seven locations to carry out my work. Below is a short description of each of the sites.

Mosques

Jogokariyan mosque is a mosque owned by Muhammadiyah that adheres to a more modernist religious tradition. Most worshippers at the mosque are either members or supporters of Muhammadiyah. The mosque is located in the southern part of the city.

General Sudirman mosque is a large, well-established mosque that exhibits a mix of religious traditions. In the Suharto era it was known for supporting student activists (who often faced pressure from the authoritarian government). The mosque deed is held by the state religion bureau, which also houses an Islamic high school and a Muhammadiyah-sponsored middle school on the complex. The mosque's location in the northeastern part of the city puts it in close proximity to both the State Islamic University and the University of Gadjah Mada. Students from these institutions regularly attend the mosque's lectures by Islamic scholars and clerics. The mosque also serves the surrounding middle-class community and is frequented by pedicab drivers and small tradesmen.

Nurul Huda mosque is a small, neighborhood-level mosque located in the Sosrowijayan neighborhood adjacent to the city's main downtown thoroughfare. The mosque was built with donations from local residents, who are a mix of working class, lower class, and middle class worshippers. Worshippers mainly work in the service sector, primarily in jobs related to the tourist industry.

Churches

Santo Antonius is a Catholic parish with priests from the Jesuit order. It is located near the city center along the same street as a major mosque and a Protestant church. This parish is particularly popular with the city's student and youth population.

Hati Santa Perawan Maria Tak Bercela (henceforth Kemetiran) is a Catholic parish with priests from the Dominus order. The parish is also located not far from the city's center, but it is less visible and centrally located than Santo Antonius. The parish is popularly referred to by the name of the surrounding neighborhood, Kemetiran, and maintains more of a traditional Javanese feeling than Santo Antonius does.

GKJ Gondokusuman is a mainline Protestant (Presbyterian) church. It is the largest GKJ church in Yogyakarta, located north of the city's center across the street from the Duta Wacana Christian University and the Protestant Bethesda Hospital.

GPdI Hagios Family (henceforth Hagios) is a Pentecostal church located in the center of the city. While the congregants comprise a broad range of ethnic backgrounds, this is the only house of worship in the analysis where no Javanese language services or activities are held.

Details about the size of these worship communities—including the number of worshippers, active volunteers, religious leaders, and paid staff—is included in Table 2.

Table 2: Size of Worship Communities

<i>House of Worship</i>	<i>Approximate # of Adherents</i>	<i>Approximate # of Active Volunteers</i>	<i># of Full-time Preachers/Priests (Churches only)</i>	<i># of Paid Staff</i>
Jogokariyan	1,400	130	NA [§]	2
General Sudirman	800*	2	NA [§]	4
Nurul Huda	300	20	NA [§]	0
Santo Antonius	10,000	230	3	13
Kemetiran	7,400	175	3	10
GKJ Gondokusuman	3,000	250	6	11
GPdI Hagios	1,700	50	10	15

[§] Mosques in Indonesia are generally not served by religious leaders dedicated to specific houses of worship, but rather have relationships with different clerics and speakers they invite and consult as needed.

*200 families; estimated four members per family

Information for this table was gathered from interviews with the religious or administrative leaders of houses of worship or from documents they provided.

As Table 2 shows, most of the houses of worship included in this study are on the larger size. All but Nurul Huda boast a number of worshippers that is much larger than the ratios displayed in Table 1 would anticipate. Both Catholic parishes have more than 7,000 adherents and the two Protestant congregations exceed 1,500 worshippers. Among the mosques, the neighborhood-based Nurul Huda is less than one-third the size of Jogokariyan, while General Sudirman is situated between these two sizes. Not surprisingly, the number of active volunteers and paid staff generally corresponds with the size of the worship community. With regard to full-time religious leadership, the Protestant congregations have a higher number of pastors than the Catholic parishes.

METHODOLOGY: PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION

The primary methodology employed in this study is participant observation of worship and non-worship activities at houses of worship. The goal of the participant observation was to determine: a) the extent to which civic skills can be learned and practiced in the context of worship communities, and b) the level of social communication and interaction that happens among members of a worship community during events held in houses of worship. While civic skills are held and practiced at the individual level, this study sought to ascertain the potential offered by engagement in houses of worship to acquire, practice, and transmit civic skills.

Participant observation was carried out by the paper's author (a white, American woman) together with three local Indonesian research assistants who had recently completed MA degrees in Religion and Cross-Cultural Studies from the University of Gadjah Mada. Most observations began in November 2014 and were completed by April 2015. Two of the Indonesian research assistants also carried out twenty-seven observations at mosques during Ramadan in June and July 2015. The full range of activities observed at each house of worship is detailed in Table 3.

Of the 289 activities observed, eighteen were observed and detailed by two individuals. The remaining observations were carried out by a single researcher. At least two different individuals carried out observations at each house of worship.⁴ We collectively produced more than 500 pages of observation reports, which serve as the primary data for my analysis.

We sought to observe as many different types of activities as possible. I relied on three methods for developing observation schedules. First, I asked the leadership of each house of worship about the schedule of events held at the mosque or church and inquired as to which activities my assistants and I could attend. Second, we took note of announcements made at worship services or published in bulletins handed out at the services. Third, when attending non-worship activities at houses of worship, we asked other participants about other activities that we might observe.

This method of data gathering was inherently incomplete. It became abundantly clear within the first weeks of observations that there were more activities at most houses of worship than could reasonably be observed at any given time. Indeed, I could have devoted my time exclusively to observing one house of worship and still found it impossible to attend every event. Generally speaking, the sites under investigation here are vibrant communities that offer a broad range of opportunities for religious and social engagement. It was also apparent that while the religious or administrative leaders of houses of worship could communicate the schedule of worship activities taking place regularly in their spaces, they were not necessarily in possession of particular details regarding the organization of groups within their communities—such as when particular study groups met, when musical rehearsals took place, or when administrative committees held meetings. On the whole, once particular responsibilities were delegated or adopted by a subgroup of the population, the religious and administrative leaders might not be aware of when specific non-worship activities were taking place.

Similarly, the content of announcements made at worship services varied across houses of worship. The primary time public announcements were made in mosques was during Friday prayer, though they were occasionally made at Koranic study group meetings. Only one mosque in the study, General Sudirman, publishes and distributes regular bulletins. The announcements made at churches varied in form and detail. GKJ and Santo Antonius publish regular bulletins with announcements about many of the churches' activities, but regularly-scheduled meetings of organized groups might not be included. Hagios plays video announcements at the end of its Sunday services, but these generally only share information about worship activities for the upcoming week, without reference to other administrative or social functions.

⁴ I carried out observations in all seven houses of worship, dividing my time more or less evenly among them. One of my research assistants focused primarily on the four Christian communities, while a second focused primarily on the three mosque communities, although she would occasionally observe Javanese-language Sunday worship services at the churches. However, because sex segregation of worship spaces and some activities in mosques precluded both me and my female, Muslim research assistant from observing the full range of mosque activities, I employed a third, male Muslim research assistant to conduct observations of Friday prayers inside the mosques.

Table 3: Activities Observed at Houses of Worship in Yogyakarta, Indonesia

<i>House of Worship</i>	Number of Distinct Events Observed	Worship and Prayer			Educational	Administrative meetings/rehearsals	Social/charitable	Neighborhood-based activities	<i>Total</i>
		Friday Prayer	Daily Prayer	Koranic study					
<i>Mosques</i>		Friday Prayer	Daily Prayer	Koranic study					
Jogokariyan	35	12	12	21	2	2	7	0	56
General Sudirman	17	9	23	16	2	0	2	1	53
Nurul Huda	13	6	9	5	1	0	4	1	26
<i>Churches</i>		Sunday worship/holiday celebrations	Weekday worship	Collective prayer					
Santo Antonius	37	21	3	3	1	5	12	0	45
Kemetiran	24	17	0	2	4	8	3	1	35
GKJ Gondokusuman	23	17	1	2	3	5	4	0	32
Hagios	26	11	12	7	2	3	2	5	42
<i>Total</i>		93	60	56	15	23	34	8	289

Notes:

Celebration of an observation of the Sacrament of Reconciliation is coded as “collective prayer”

Celebration of adult baptism at Kemetiran is coded as “Sunday Worship”

All of the activities under “Administrative Meetings/Rehearsals” at Hagios are “rehearsals”

While incomplete, our approach for selecting which events to observe yielded a data sample that was largely representative of the types of activities found at each house of worship. Moreover, the process of becoming participant observers in these worship communities was not dissimilar to what a new member of the community would experience herself. Consequently, while I cannot claim to have observed every possible activity held at the houses of worship, the process of gathering information about the schedule of activities itself revealed meaningful information about the structure of houses of worship and their communities.

The second methodology employed in this study was interviews with members of these worship communities. I conducted structured interviews with religious or administrative leaders at all houses of worship. Additionally, I interviewed active leaders within the worship communities in several instances. Lastly, my research assistants and I conducted numerous informal interviews with worshippers and participants in the communities over the course of participant observation and documented these conversations as well.

CIVIC SKILL OPPORTUNITY SCALE

As the first column of Table 3 shows, we observed between thirteen to thirty-seven distinct activities at each house of worship. In several instances, we observed the same activity more than once. In particular, at locations where the number of regularly scheduled activities was low, such as at Nurul Huda, it was necessary to observe the same activity several times. Additionally, we aimed to observe a Sunday worship service every week at a church and Friday prayers every week at a mosque.⁵ As the data displayed in Table 3 reveals, the overwhelming majority of activities we observed, 72.6 percent, involved worship or prayer in the house of worship. Given that the primary mission of all of these establishments is to provide space for a worship community, it is not surprising that most of our observations involve worship activities. Approximately 11.5 percent of observations were for social and charitable activities, 8 percent were for administrative or organizational activities, 5.2 percent were educational, and 2.8 percent were activities held in the homes of worshippers. In total, we observed 135 events in mosques and 154 in churches.

It is important to note that the classification scheme elaborated in Table 3 involved some subjective decision-making about how to categorize particular events. In many instances, the events observed were a hybrid of different types of activities—for example, the practice of *pengajian* among Indonesian Muslims. *Pengajian* roughly translates to “recitation of the Koran.” I have coded this activity in Table 3 as “Koranic study,” as my observations have revealed a practice that, while encompassing recitation of Muslims’ holy book, is not limited to only that activity. The structure and size of *pengajian* varies considerably among Indonesian Muslims, but every such event that I have attended involves a combination of worship, education, and social activity. Some *pengajian* are large, with hundreds of attendees. In these instances, a relatively well-known invited Muslim cleric is usually invited to speak extensively on some particular theme

⁵ The task of observing Friday prayers was more complicated than observing church services for several reasons. First, Friday prayers always take place at noon, making it impossible for the same researcher to observe prayers in more than one location. All of the churches in the study had at least two Sunday services, making it possible for the same researcher to usually attend more than one service. Second, because Friday prayer participation is limited to Muslim males, it was not possible for me, my female RA, or my male Christian RA to enter the mosque for observation. Consequently, my one male Muslim RA needed to rotate among the mosques each week. Two of the mosques, Jogokariyan and General Sudirman, had open pavilions, which made it possible to observe the activity from outside the mosque and to hear some of the service via amplification. Once we discovered this possibility, my female RA and I would observe Friday prayers at these mosques from a distance.

for most of the time, and actual recitation will be limited to a few verses of the Koran at the close of the event. Yet many of the *pengajian* I attended in Yogyakarta had between thirty and fifty participants, usually all neighbors. These worshippers might take turns reciting different verses of the Koran and an invited teacher would also speak on a theme, but there might be more of an opportunity for conversation with the teacher than at a larger *pengajian*. It was not uncommon at these smaller *pengajian* for all participants to share a meal together at the close of the event. Recognizing that many of the events I observed comprised a range of activities, I have selected the categorization that I think most closely aligns with the dominant allocation of time at the event.

When observing events, my research assistants and I sought to employ “thick description” (Geertz, 2000), making note of all actions and interactions visible to us in the context of our observations. We collected extensive information about the number of participants in each event, their visible demographic characteristics, their demeanor, and their interaction with each other. We paid close attention to how events were structured, particularly events that were not part of standard religious obligation, such as social, administrative, or auxiliary spiritual events. Was there a formal agenda for the event? Who spoke? Were there opportunities for presentations, deliberation, and discussion? We also made note of the dynamic between religious leaders and worshippers at events. Did religious leaders or members of the worship community play the primary roles for convening, planning, and leading events? Were religious leaders the dominant voices in presentations and discussions or was their participation limited? Was there a free exchange of ideas between religious leaders and the worshippers in communities?

Based on information gleaned from observation reports and interviews with leaders in the houses of worship, I have sought to measure the extent to which each house of worship provides opportunities for its members to acquire and practice civic skills. As discussed above, the notion that different institutional settings will yield differential opportunities to individuals to develop civic skills is not meant to be specific to religious institutions, but is true of the workplace and other non-political voluntary associations as well. In their study of civic skill acquisition and practice, Verba, Scholzman, and Brady (1995) noted that variation in the practice of civic skills among churches was largely a reflection of differences in religious institutions rather than differences in the individuals who practiced civic skills across institutions. Because these scholars were looking exclusively at Christian houses of worship in the United States, the institutional difference that was most striking to them was between Catholics and Protestants. The authors postulated several ways in which the differences between Catholic and Protestant congregations might yield more opportunities for civic skill development among Protestant congregations than Catholic parishes—namely that Protestant congregations are smaller than Catholic parishes, they allow for greater participation from the laity in liturgies, and have fewer structured connections within a larger confessional hierarchy.

I expand upon these observations to consider the potential for civic skill development within houses of worship more generally. I have developed a Civic Skill Opportunity scale that comprises three different dimensions of institutional characteristics that are likely to impact the degree to which opportunities to acquire and practice civic skills are present in houses of worship: (1) volume and variety of events, (2) level of formalized organizational structure, and (3) decision-making authority. First, the greater the volume and variety of events offered at a house of worship, the greater the opportunities are for members to become involved in the organization and implementation of activities. Second, the more formalized the organizational structure of a house of worship, the greater the likelihood is that the entity will hold regular planning or reporting meetings—providing opportunities to practice deliberation and communication skills. Third, the

more decision-making authority is vested in members of the worship community as opposed to religious leaders or administrative staff, the greater the opportunity to cultivate and practice civic skills. Each of these three dimensions are combined additively to generate a Civic Skill Opportunity score. The lowest score of 0 suggests there is virtually no potential for members of the community to develop and practice civic skills. The highest score of 12 suggests that virtually all work of the worship community is carried out by its members, offering extensive practice in developing civic skills. The specific coding of each dimension can be found in the Appendix.

To be clear, the scores given to houses of worship on the Civic Skill Opportunity scale are exclusively measures of the *potential* for civic skills to be acquired and practiced. These scores are not equivalent to measures of actual civic skill practice by members of the worship communities and should not be treated as such. Whether a house of worship's Civic Skill Opportunity score correlates with the actual practice of civic skills in a specific house of worship is an empirical question that is beyond the scope of this paper.

Table 4 scores the seven houses of worship in the present study according to the Civic Skills Opportunity scale. Scores range from a low of 2 for the Nurul Huda neighborhood mosque to a high of 12 for the mainline Protestant GKJ congregation. While the two Catholic parishes score very similarly (9 and 10), the houses of worship do not necessarily score in a way that shows a perfect correlation with religious denomination. The greatest variation can be seen in the mosques, with the Jogokariyan mosque showing the median Civic Skills Opportunity score among the cases at 9. The other two mosques display the lowest scores. The evangelical Protestant congregation, Hagios, has a score that is 6 points below that of the mainline GKJ, ranking it lower in Civic Skills Opportunity than either of the Catholic parishes and the Jogokariyan mosque.

Table 4: Civic Skills Opportunity Scores

<i>House of Worship</i>	<i>Volume and variety of events</i>	<i>Level of formalized organizational structure</i>	<i>Degree of primary decision-making</i>	<i>Civic Skills Opportunity Score</i>
Jogokariyan	4	2	3	9
General Sudirman	2	1	1	4
Nurul Huda	1	1	0	2
Santo Antonius	4	4	2	10
Kemetiran	3	4	2	9
GKJ Gondokusuman	4	4	4	12
Hagios	2	3	1	6

A closer look at the discrete dimensions of the Civic Skills Opportunity scale demonstrates the broad range of particular characteristics within a house of worship that determine the extent to which civic skill development is on offer. When the Civic Skill Opportunity scale scores are viewed within their specific dimensions, some denominational patterns start to appear. On the whole, we see little denomination-specific patterns in the volume and variety of events offered in the houses of worship. Almost all of the religious communities investigated here have specific events, committees, or organizations targeted to particular demographic groups, such as the young, the elderly, or women. Such variation was least developed at Nurul Huda, which offered a monthly women's Koranic study meeting but no other activities aimed at specific groups. Yet, the three houses of worship with the highest possible score on this dimension represent three different traditions: Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism. Thus, differences in religious denomination are not reflected in the first dimension.

While the volume and variety of events on offer do not generally correlate with religious denomination, the other two dimensions tend to show higher scores for Christian congregations than mosques. Consequently, the level of Civic Skill Opportunity among Muslim communities is generally low. Jogokariyan distinguishes itself from the other two mosques included in this study in both the volume and variety of events it hosts and in the level of decision-making held by worshippers. The following section offers some preliminary explanation for this variation.

A PRELIMINARY EXPLANATION: HIERARCHY, WORSHIP STYLE, AND MINORITY STATUS

While any number of factors contribute to the specificities of how individual churches or mosques organize their work and, by extension, the degree to which they provide worshippers with opportunities to develop civic skills, there are some factors that appear to explain general variation in Civic Skill Opportunity scores across the houses of worship examined here. The three primary factors are (1) embeddedness in a religious hierarchy, (2) style of worship, and the (3) relative size of the religious denomination within the local community. Secondary factors that also play a role are the size of the community the house of worship is serving and its financial resources.

As discussed above, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady speculated that Catholic parishes' embeddedness in a larger church hierarchy limited the practice of civic skills in Catholic congregations compared to their more autonomous Protestant peers. This speculation is partially borne out in our data, as Table 4 shows that the two Catholic parishes in this study have lower overall civic skills scores than the mainline Protestant GKJ. However, when we consider the role of hierarchical embeddedness across the full range of cases, we observe a general negative correlation: the three houses of worship that are part of a hierarchical structure have the three highest Civic Skill Opportunity scores, and three of the four autonomous houses of worship have the three lowest scores. Only the Jogokariyan mosque, which is completely autonomous, has a score equivalent to that of one of the Catholic parishes (Kemetiran).

Upon closer examination, I find that the presence of a hierarchical structure in some houses of worship has contributed to a greater formalization of these houses' organization. For example, while the hierarchy of the Catholic Church limits the autonomy of individual parishes to make certain decisions, it also creates a need for a more formalized organizational structure to implement higher-order directives. The Catholic cases examined here are part of the Archdiocese of Semarang, which dictates that each parish should be divided into a system of neighborhood districts for the organization and implementation of activities. A similar example is seen in the GKJ. While the GKJ holds considerably more congregational-level autonomy than a Catholic parish, it is grouped into a hierarchy of classis and synod assemblies that are typical for Presbyterian congregations. Presbyterianism, by its very design, is meant to be highly representative and participatory, and in the case of the GKJ, inclusion in a larger hierarchy likely increases opportunities for civic skill development. From a civic skills perspective, it is extremely significant that these churches require the congregation to be organized down to the level of specific neighborhoods, as it automatically creates a structure that requires greater individual participation in running the affairs of the church.

In contrast, even though mosques are independent entities that are not incorporated into a hierarchical structure, the lack of hierarchy does not necessarily guarantee the presence of formal internal organization or extensive input by worshippers in the mosques' decision-making. As Table

4 shows, the Jogokariyan mosque exhibits both a more formal organizational structure and more extensive worshipper input in decision-making than the other two mosques in the study.

The lack of a firm connection between the autonomy of a house of worship and its overall Civic Skills Opportunity score is further confirmed by the case of the Hagios church. This Pentecostal house of worship is an independent entity that is not incorporated into a hierarchical structure. While the level of formalized organization at Hagios is higher than that observed at any mosque, making it look more similar to the other Christian congregations, the level of worshipper input in decision-making is much lower. Similar to two of the three mosques, at Hagios the primary decisions are made by religious or administrative leaders. The remaining Christian houses of worship in this study have much higher scores on the decision-making authority dimension.

Ironically, it appears as though level of hierarchical embeddedness and level of formalized organizational structure are *negatively* correlated: the greater the level of institutional autonomy, the less likely the institution is to have a formalized organizational structure. Formal organization has an impact on the practice of civic skills in houses of worship. Greater formalization generally means clearer paths for recruiting volunteers and delegating tasks to members of the worship communities in a fashion that is more inclusive and representative. When organizational structures are less formalized, informal channels are regularly used to assign tasks. Under such circumstances, it is usually the same, small group of individuals that is called upon, offering fewer opportunities for civic skills to develop across the community.

Yet, the correlation between autonomy and formalization of organizational structure (or decision-making authority) is not perfect. Rather, what the four autonomous cases examined here demonstrate is that when houses of worship are not part of a hierarchy, they have complete freedom to determine their own structure. The Jogokariyan mosque has used its autonomy to empower its worshippers to organize and implement activities and make decisions, while the remaining mosques tend to leave most organizational and decision-making work to administrators. The cases in this study point to an intervening variable that can play a considerable role in determining how houses of worship that are autonomous determine their structure: leadership.

Among all seven houses of worship investigated here, two stood out as communities in which beloved, charismatic leaders have made a strong imprint on the organization and style of the house of worship. The first example is the head administrator (*ketua takmir*) of the Jogokariyan mosque, Jazir. When my observation period began in November 2015, Mr. Jazir had been the head administrator of the Jogokariyan mosque for fifteen years. He introduced a system of mosque management that emphasized decentralization and active participation by community members. He authored and popularized the mosque's motto, "From the mosque we build community."⁶

What is particularly interesting about Mr. Jazir's leadership is that he was elected to the position of head administrator. The Jogokariyan mosque holds popular elections among mosque members to determine the finalists for the administrator position, with the final decision made by the finalists, the existing administrator, and the head of the mosque's Committee for Takmir Elections. An election for administrator occurred during the course of my observation period, allowing me to observe firsthand the degree of coordinated organization the election required. Mr. Jazir did not stand for re-election, communicating to me in an interview that he had been serving in this role long enough and was ready to hand over the reins to the next generation. Many mosque members with whom I spoke were disappointed to see his leadership come to an end. The competitiveness of the elections, the active involvement of mosque members in voting, and the high level of participation in activities related to the installation of the new leadership were

⁶ In Indonesian, "Dari masjid membangun ummat."

evidence, however, that Mr. Jazir's decentralized management approach had established deep roots at Jogokariyan, and that a new generation of leaders had amassed considerable management experience in implementing it. I am doubtful that Jogokariyan's Civic Skill Opportunity score would be as high without Mr. Jazir's leadership, as he clearly played an instrumental role in shaping the mosque's scores on the three dimensions in the scale.

The second example is the pastor of Hagios, Dr. Samuel J. Suwondo. Pastor Samuel has been serving the Hagios community since 1989 when his father, the founder of the congregation, passed away. Pastor Samuel is a highly educated and passionate preacher with strong social skills that allow him to connect with a broad range of individuals. People are attracted to Hagios not only for Pastor Samuel's preaching, but also for the church's professional-quality music at worship services and for the very strong sense of religious community he has built. Like Mr. Jazir at Jogokariyan, Pastor Samuel's leadership has significantly shaped the structure and style of Hagios. Yet, in contrast to all of the other houses of worship included in this study, Pastor Samuel has relied less on active members of the worship community to plan and implement the church's functions. Rather, he has focused on building a strong foundation of professional staff to serve the community (see Table 2). Consequently, while Hagios has a clear organizational structure, there is little representation by the laity or unpaid staff in decision-making bodies. This stronger reliance on professional staff produces a high-quality product with regard to the services the church provides, but also limits the civic skill opportunities available to worshippers.

The second factor that explains variation in Civic Skill Opportunity is an obvious, yet frequently overlooked difference between mosques and churches: the style of worship. In Islam, the most important religious obligation is to perform the five daily prayers, which can happen in a mosque or at home. This religious obligation is relatively easy to organize. Muslims performing the prayer individually outside of the mosque will do so on their own. When the prayer is performed collectively in a mosque, the only requirement is for an adult male to stand at the front of the worshippers and lead the prayer so it is in unison. Any Muslim man present can perform this function—he does not need to be a cleric or scholar or hold some particular type of religious title. In contrast, for Christians—both Catholics and Protestants—the most important religious obligation is weekly attendance at the Sunday service. In contrast to Muslims' daily prayers, Sunday worship for all Christian denominations requires more coordinated organization. Services usually comprise some reading or study of biblical passages, music, and preaching from an ordained minister or priest.

These differences in worship style manifest themselves indirectly in the types of events on offer at different houses of worship in Table 3. We see a clear difference between mosques and churches in the column for administrative meetings and rehearsals. We were unable to observe any such events in two of the mosques. In particular, there was never anything necessitating a rehearsal at a mosque. All of our churches, however, had regular rehearsals for the different groups responsible for providing music for Sunday services. The Catholic parishes also had regular practice sessions for the altar servers, as well as rehearsals for more significant religious celebrations, such as performances at Christmas pageants or live Stations of the Cross prayer services during Lent.

The more elaborate preparations necessary for Sunday worship services also foster the need for greater administration within Christian churches compared to mosques. For example, the Kemetiran parish does not have a specific parish choir. Rather, the parish is divided into thirteen districts, and each district rotates in providing the vocal music for Indonesian-language services. This system necessitates a variety of different administrative steps—from a music committee to

select the music for each week, a coordinator to schedule an organist for each service, as well as district representatives recruiting parishioners to sing and coordinating rehearsals of the ad hoc ensembles. All of these different tasks are carried out by unpaid members of the worship community, providing considerable opportunity for the development of civic skills. These types of smaller tasks for administration and coordination, in general, help to facilitate a culture of formalized administration to carry out a broad range of the churches' functions, starting with the organization of worship services, but also including religious education, social services, and community-building activities.

In contrast, we found few examples of formalized administration in organizing or carrying out events in mosques. The Jogokariyan mosque does have a system in place in which all primary mosque functions are organized under twelve bureaus that are comprised of active members of the worship community. A meeting of bureau heads is scheduled to take place approximately once per month, but during our observation period we found that meetings were sometimes cancelled due to lack of business. Analogous structures were absent from the General Sudirman and Nurul Huda mosques. We observed that rather than relying on formal meetings to manage organizational details, much of the administrative work that happens in formal meetings at churches takes place in mosque settings through informal discussions among active worshippers. This more informal nature of administration is a direct outgrowth of the style of worship—not only in that Islamic worship obligations require less advance preparation than Christian services, but also because worshippers tend to meet each other more frequently.

Over the course of our observations at all three mosques, we noted that in most instances, individuals who came to mosque to perform their prayers usually lived or worked in close proximity to the mosque, arrived to pray, and then quickly departed the mosque. The one important exception, however, was the period between the fourth and fifth daily prayers, *maghrib* and *isha'a*. The timing of the daily prayers in Islam is determined by the positioning of the sun, which means that prayer time does not correspond to clock time and also varies across geographic locations and time of year. Prayer timing in Indonesia, however, is more stable than in other parts of the world due to the country's location. The equator passes through the northern part of the country and the island of Java, where Yogyakarta is located, is just south of it. Consequently, the time that the sun rises and sets varies by only approximately 15 minutes over the course of a year. In Yogyakarta, the *maghrib*—or sunset—prayer usually takes place between 5:30 and 6 p.m., with *isha'a* taking place about an hour later.

We found that the period between *maghrib* and *isha'a* was very important in the lives of our mosques for several reasons. First, most individuals had completed their work or school days by this time and were starting to relax for the evening. They generally did not need to rush off after praying *maghrib* and might use the time after the prayer to visit with other neighbors or friends who were also at the mosque. Second, since the interval between *maghrib* and *isha'a* was not very long, individuals might choose to wait at the mosque or its nearby areas between the two prayers. Mosque officials' awareness that the interval between *maghrib* and *isha'a* was a convenient time for some worshippers to engage in community activities is reflected in the schedules of the General Sudirman and Jogokariyan mosques. General Sudirman offered Koranic study sessions on Tuesday and Friday nights between the two prayers. Jogokariyan used the time for children's religious instruction, a strategy which also encouraged parents to bring their children to the mosque to pray. On Saturdays, the mosque would have a special Koranic study session just for youth between the two prayers. The mosque introduced several new programs as the observation period for this project was coming to a close, which included a new Koranic study session between

maghrib and *isha'a* on Wednesday evening and a family evening on Saturday. The family evening would start with praying the *maghrib* prayer together with one's family, followed by Koranic study, the *isha'a* prayer, and concluding with a soup supper.

While programming specifically timed to take place between *maghrib* and *isha'a* was one way mosque worshippers would pass the time between the two prayers, of greater consequence was the informal socializing that regularly occurred when other events were not scheduled. In particular, a traditional Indonesian food cart (*angkringan*) was located on the street with a bench pushed up against the Jogokariyan mosque building. The active volunteers from the mosque community would regularly buy tea from the cart and pull up chairs to visit between the two prayers. Inevitably, whenever I sought to meet a member of the Jogokariyan community or wanted to interview someone, I was told to come to the mosque after *maghrib* as the individual would most certainly be there and free to talk.

The nearly daily face-to-face encounters of the most active members of these communities, coupled with time for socializing between fulfilling their religious obligations, created ample informal opportunities for planning, coordination, and problem-solving. Since the individuals most likely to implement auxiliary worship events, social and charitable programming, and community activities at the mosque came regularly to pray at the mosque in the evenings, there was little need for formal meetings. The relevant individuals would find each other at the mosque and make decisions or plans on an informal, as-needed basis.

In sum, the style of Muslim worship creates little need for advance preparation and integrates many religious obligations (such as daily prayers and fasting for Ramadan) into daily life in such a way that less overall work is required of mosques to fulfill their functions as houses of worship. Additionally, the obligation of daily prayers, coupled with the specific timing of the sunset and nightfall prayers in Indonesia, means that active members of the Muslim worship communities meet regularly at the mosque, creating sufficient opportunities for informal decision-making that obviate the need for formal meetings and extensive administrative structures. In contrast, Christian rituals for Sunday worship require substantial advance preparation and many religious obligations require the presence of a religious leader, necessitating coordination with priests or pastors. Additionally, because Christians' primary worship obligation is weekly instead of daily, worship community members meet less frequently, necessitating more formal organization. While the mosque and church communities in this study appeared to be very successful in fulfilling their religious missions and meeting the spiritual needs of their worshippers, a consequence of these different worship styles translates into considerably more civic skill opportunities in churches than in mosques.

A second factor that helps to explain variation in the Civic Skill Opportunity scores is the relative size of the religious denominations within the city of Yogyakarta. Most Christians in the city—both Catholics and Protestants—are minorities within their neighborhoods. As a result, there is a functional need for specific churches and parishes to assist Christian worshippers in maintaining community. All four of the Christian houses of worship in this study employed a system of dividing their worship communities into smaller, geographic districts. The roles of these districts functioned similarly across the mainline Protestant, evangelical Protestant, and Catholic houses of worship, although the level of authority and responsibility varied from highest with GKJ to lowest in Hagios, with the Catholic parishes leaning closer to the model employed by GKJ.

Specifically, in each case there would be some sort of district representation that would serve as a liaison between worshippers living in a particular area and the church's religious and administrative leadership. The Catholic parishes and GKJ held elections at the district level for

representatives, while at Hagios the pastoral leadership selected representatives. The responsibilities carried out by district representatives varied from case to case. The large size of both the Santo Antonius and Kemetiran Catholic parishes meant that these houses of worship used the system of district representation to organize a broad range of parish functions and to serve as the primary communication channel between parish leadership and worshippers. The highly representative system the GKJ employs for decision-making is also reflected in the district representatives, which constitute the smallest and most intimate format for deliberation and discussion of church affairs. In all cases there would be some opportunities for in-home worship or spiritual gatherings in the districts. In the Catholic parishes, priests would rotate through the communities to offer neighborhood-level Mass about once per month. Hagios held praise nights organized by neighborhood leaders twice per month, and GKJ held services or meetings in neighborhoods weekly or bi-weekly. Additionally, the district leaders were expected to keep in general contact with church members in their district and provide feedback to church leaders when specific families or members were experiencing hardships. This system offered a clear mechanism for members of the worship community to practice a range of civic skills, from organizing events to making presentations and participating in decision making.

Additionally, because Christians constitute a minority in Yogyakarta, many Christians live a considerable distance from their houses of worship. Consequently, greater advance planning is necessary for active members to meet and organize activities or implement plans. Church members cannot rely on high-probability chance meetings with other volunteers to ensure that their specific tasks will be accomplished—they need to schedule meetings and set up procedures to ensure that responsibilities are delegated and carried out. In contrast, because Islam is the majority religion in Yogyakarta and the ratio of mosques to Christian houses of worship in the city is nearly six to one, most Muslims live both near other Muslims and near their house of worship. As a result, it is much easier for the mosque to play a more integrated role in neighborhood life, reducing the need for extensive formal organization and increasing reliance on informal channels for deliberation, decision-making, and planning. The indirect result is that churches offer more opportunities for building and practicing civic skills.

Lastly, two secondary factors also contribute to the variation in Civic Skill Opportunity scores observed here. First is the size of the religious community. Not surprisingly, houses of worship with a larger number of worshippers will find themselves offering a greater volume of events, and likely have need to offer a greater variety of events as well. Looking back at Table 2 and Table 4, we see that the size of the worship community and the volume and variety of events it offers are correlated—though not perfectly. Yet, this observation raises some questions about whether volume of events alone is of consequence to civic skill opportunities, or rather whether the more relevant measure is a ratio between the number of events on offer and the size of the worship community.

The other secondary factor is the house of worship's financial resources. I did not ask houses of worship directly for their budgetary information, therefore I cannot compare expenses and revenue across cases directly. However, I did ask about revenue streams and the socioeconomic composition of the worship communities. Other indicators of financial resources were made obvious, such as the quality of the physical resources of the house of worship, the types of resources that were present and in use during different events, and houses' own public announcements to worshippers about the size of collections taken at Friday prayers or Sunday services. While all communities mentioned members of their worship communities who experienced material hardship and all offered some basic social services to families in need, the

church communities, in general, appeared to have more financial resources on hand than most of the mosques. Once again, Jogokariyan stood out as an exception of a mosque with considerable resources that were strategically deployed for programming and community-building. Yet, even within the four church communities, Hagios stood in a category of its own regarding general indicators of economic health. The church's financial security was most evident in the number of pastors and paid staff it was able to employ. On the whole, it seems as though the higher the ratio of paid staff to worshippers, the lower the need for assistance from worshippers for voluntary labor to implement the functions of the house of worship.

Based on the cases under investigation here, it appears as though financial resources have something of a curvilinear relationship with civic skill opportunities: houses with few resources—such as Nurul Huda—have little available for the extensive programming that tends to require planning and labor, while those with considerable resources—such as Hagios—are in the position to hire paid staff to work on the organization and implementation of a house of worship's functions. It appears as though the middle spectrum of financial resources is where civic skill opportunities are most pronounced: a house of worship has sufficient resources to engage in meaningful planning and implementation of auxiliary spiritual, social, and community activities, but must rely on the volunteer labor of worshippers to implement the programs.

In sum, the variation in Civic Skill Opportunity scores exhibited by the seven houses of worship in this study can be explained primarily by the embeddedness of the house of worship in a hierarchy, differences in style of worship, and the relative size of the worship community. Generally speaking, I find that participating in a religious hierarchy tends to foster a greater emphasis on formalized organization in houses of worship, which, in turn, creates opportunities for civic skill development. When houses of worship are autonomous entities, there is complete freedom for them to determine their leadership structure. In the cases investigated here, the Jogokariyan mosque used this freedom to formalize organizational structures and empower worshippers with decision-making authority to a much greater degree than the other mosques. Additionally, differences in style of worship between Islam and Christianity tend to create a functional need for more formal organization in churches compared to mosques, which can accomplish their planning and decision-making through informal channels. Similarly, Christianity's status as a minority religion in Yogyakarta further encourages formal organizational structures and advance planning to bring together members of the community. Indonesian Muslims' close proximity to their mosques allows for a more fluid relationship between the house of worship and the daily lives of its worshippers, further reinforcing informal channels for organization and decision-making. The end result is that, on the whole, the factors that tend to contribute to greater civic skill opportunities align more commonly with Christian houses of worship than with Muslim ones.

This pattern is further reinforced by two secondary factors: size of the worship community and its wealth. In the cases examined here, those two factors, generally speaking, align in a way to further strengthen the denominational divide between churches and mosques, but also help to explain Jogokariyan's exceptionalism and Hagios' lower Civic Skill Opportunity score compared to the other churches.

The primary explanatory argument is displayed in Table 5, with the specific houses of worship placed in cells according to their measures on the explanatory variables. This visual aid helps to further reinforce the Jogokariyan mosque's outlier status within this sample set, highlighting the importance of leadership in the case of autonomous houses of worship.

Table 5: Explanatory Rubric for Variation in Civic Skill Opportunity Scores

	Embeddedness in Hierarchy	Style of Worship	Relative Status of Religious Denomination
Enhances Civic Skill Opportunities	<i>Part of a hierarchy</i> GKJ, Kemetiran, Santo Antonius	<i>Emphasis on weekly practice with advance preparation</i> GKJ, Kemetiran, Santo Antonius, Hagios	<i>Minority</i> GKJ, Kemetiran, Santo Antonius, Hagios
Limits Civic Skill Opportunities	<i>Autonomous</i> Hagios, Jogokariyan, General Sudirman, Nurul Huda	<i>Emphasis on daily practice without advance preparation</i> Jogokariyan, General Sudirman, Nurul Huda	<i>Majority</i> Jogokariyan, General Sudirman, Nurul Huda

CONCLUSION

The analysis presented here has sought to examine the civic skill opportunities of both churches and mosques under the broader concept of houses of worship. Intensive analysis of seven worship communities in Yogyakarta, Indonesia reveals considerable variation across houses of worship with regard to the potential they have in offering opportunities for civic skill development. In particular, I find that mosques tend to offer fewer possibilities for individuals to practice organizational and communication skills. There are several factors that influence the Civic Skill Opportunity score earned by a house of worship. On the whole, embeddedness in a hierarchy; an emphasis on highly structured, weekly worship; and status as a minority religion have tended to foster greater formalized organization and decentralization of decision-making among Christian congregations, increasing the opportunities for worshippers to practice civic skills in these communities. In contrast, institutional autonomy, an emphasis on daily worship that does not require advance planning, and majority religious status has generally facilitated an emphasis on informal channels for planning and decision-making across mosques. Yet, even within this broad pattern, two houses of worship fall outside of this Muslim-Christian denominational divide. Hagios's autonomy from a religious hierarchy has given the congregation the autonomy to follow the vision of a charismatic leader, who has focused on developing a professional staff to carry out most church functions, an outcome made possible by the church's healthy financial resources. Jogokariyan's autonomy paved the way for a different charismatic leader to introduce and develop a management style that placed a strong emphasis on organization and input from worshippers, leading to a much higher Civic Skill Opportunity score than observed in other mosques.

There are several implications for these findings. First, the more traditional distinctions made between Catholicism and Protestantism that suggest Protestant congregations are more likely than their Catholic counterparts to serve as incubators of political participation become less precise when we view these two denominations through the broader lens of houses of worship. The cases examined here first showed that meaningful differences exist between mainline and evangelical Protestant denominations (although this finding cannot be generalized without comparable data from other, similarly-structured Protestant denominations). More significantly, however, when viewed together with mosques, we see that Christian congregations have more similarity than difference with regard to the opportunities for cultivating civic skill development.

To be clear, this paper is not arguing that a house of worship's Civic Skill Opportunity score is in any way a reflection of its success at fulfilling its duties to its worshippers. Individuals do not select their house of worship based on the role it might play in cultivating their civic skills.

Yet, the denominational divide that this study uncovers does have particular implications for Muslims in Indonesia, particularly for women. I found that women's groups exist in all seven houses of worship, whether in the form of women's Koranic study groups, bible groups, or neighborhood district representation. However, in church structures, women are not limited to the women's groups, but rather serve on a range of committees or play other significant leadership roles in preparing and implementing religious and social functions. While men still dominate leadership positions in all houses of worship, women are present and heavily involved in Catholic and Protestant communities.

In contrast, women are largely excluded from mosque organizational structures that are not specific to women. The male dominance of mosque leadership, while reinforced by sex segregation in worship, is largely a byproduct of the informal channels mosques rely on for delegating responsibilities and making decisions. Since informal socializing between *maghrib* and *isha'a* prayers or after Friday prayers is the primary locus for most mosque organization, women are usually physically absent from the discussion. Women do not participate in Friday prayers, and those women that come to the mosque to pray *maghrib* or *isha'a* are often balancing these obligations while also preparing the family's evening meal or looking after the children. Their absence is overlooked in a way that would be less likely if formal meeting times were structured so that they could attend. Women are active in the lives of their mosques—they regularly outnumber the men in mixed Koranic study sessions and have their own vibrant communities. Notably, these groups tend to meet for prayer, study, and organization either in the mid-afternoon after the *asr* prayer, or in the later evening, after *isha'a*. The exclusion of women from involvement in greater mosque organization further prevents women from the opportunity to gain and practice civic skills in a non-work setting. As a result, the inequalities that women in Indonesia already experience with regard to education and access to skill development in the workplace are further reinforced by the organizational norms of mosques.

Rather than thinking about mosques as potential sources of radicalization, we might instead consider their potential role in democratization. When taking a longer-term perspective about the important role of churches as locations through which individuals learned skills that helped them become more active participants in the advanced democracies of the West, we may question whether the more limited array of civic skill opportunities presented at mosques, and the gendered nature of their accessibility, might partially explain why democracy is far less widespread in Muslim-majority countries. If we were to take this finding and think about its policy application, we might ask how to foster mosque development that follows the approach taken on by the Jogokariyan mosque, where civic skill opportunities are more widespread and democratic norms prevail.

APPENDIX: CIVIC SKILLS OPPORTUNITY SCALE

Volume and variety of events that require organizational participation from non-professional members of worship communities (i.e. opportunities for members to organize and lead meetings, write letters, speak publicly, make reports, take responsibility for budgets).

- 0 Events at house of worship are limited to Friday prayers (mosque) or Sunday worship services (churches), the organization of which is determined exclusively by religious leaders and administrative staff.
- 1 Events at house of worship include some auxiliary worship or spiritual events, such as weekday worship or Koranic study. Religious leaders and administrative staff provide most of the organization and implementation of these events.
- 2 Events at house of worship include some auxiliary worship or spiritual activities as well as some social and educational events targeted to the primary demographic groups that comprise the worship community. Members of the worship communities assist in the implementation of activities, but usually under the supervision of religious leaders or administrative staff.
- 3 Events at house of worship include a wide range of social, educational, or spiritual activities targeted to each specific demographic group that comprises the worship community. Non-professional members of these demographic groups play a significant role in the organization and implementation of the groups' activities.
- 4 Events at house of worship include a wide range of social, educational, or spiritual activities targeted to each specific demographic group that comprises the worship community. In total, the volume of auxiliary activities is much greater than the number of obligatory prayer or worship services. The house of worship relies on the non-professional members of these demographic groups to organize and implement the groups' activities.

Level of formalized organizational structure for determining how events are organized and how responsibilities for particular tasks are delegated.

- 0 There is no formal organizational structure for determining responsibilities and delegating responsibilities.
- 1 A formal organizational structure is in place for determining responsibilities related to the structure of worship and educational events. Informal avenues determine how the remaining functions are carried out. Regular meetings in order to make plans and delegate responsibilities are not held. Alternately, formal organizational structures exist for the implementation of ad-hoc events, such as major religious holidays or spiritual retreats, while informal mechanisms are in place to determine responsibilities for other functions.
- 2 A formal organizational structure delineates how most functions of the house of worship are carried out, but most of the deliberation and determination of specific responsibilities occur through informal channels or directives from religious leaders or administrators. Regular meetings in order to make plans, delegate responsibilities, and reach decisions are not held.
- 3 A formal organizational structure delineates how most functions of the house of worship are carried out, but some tasks are delegated on an ad-hoc basis. Regular meetings are held for many of the various bodies of the organization and there are some mechanisms in place for reporting and accountability, but some lines of responsibility remain unclear.

- 4 A formal organizational structure delineates how all functions of the house of worship are carried out. Regular meetings are held for various bodies of the organization and clear mechanisms for reporting and accountability are in place.

Degree to which primary decisions are made by religious leaders vs. ordinary members of worship communities.

- 0 All decisions are made by religious leaders or appointed administrators.
- 1 All primary decisions are made by religious leaders or appointed administrators, but these leaders might delegate some decision-making authority to members of the worship community that they select.
- 2 All doctrinal decisions are made by religious leaders, but decisions about the organization of auxiliary spiritual, social, and educational activities are made by members of the worship community, often through a representative process.
- 3 Most decisions are made by ordinary members of the worship community through a representative, electoral process, although there may be some instances when decision-making power is held by religious leaders or appointed administrators.
- 4 All decisions are made by ordinary members of the worship community through a representative, electoral process.

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