Reclassifying Islamist Organizations: A Multidimensional Typology of Political Islam

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Introduction

Political Islam, or Islamism, is widely present in political organizations in Muslim-majority countries throughout the world. Islamist parties have had great success in a number of Muslim-majority countries that have held increasingly open elections over the past decade, including Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey. In the wake of the Arab Spring, which initially had a liberalizing effect in regards to elections in the Middle East and North Africa, Islamists were the primary electoral beneficiaries of these increasingly competitive contests. Outside of the arena of electoral politics, Islamist organizations have taken up the task of providing for social service programs in their respective countries. Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood was an archetypal example of this social services provision, as the organization maintained extensive school and hospital networks prior to their dismantling by the Egyptian regime (Brooke, 2017). This is to say that people in majority-Muslim countries are in frequent contact with the institutions and rhetoric associated with movements of political Islam.

Despite political Islam's centrality to the civic and political life in many majority-Muslim countries, Western political and academic discourse commonly discusses this highly consequential concept with little nuance or attention to its many actors' diversity of tactics and objectives. Political Islam is frequently defined by only its most general parameters, but its most general parameters actually tell us very little about specific Islamist actors. When one refers to Islamist actors in the Middle East and North Africa, are they referring to Tunisia's Ennahda, a non-violent participant in electoral democracy? Or is the term employed to reference the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), which aims to violently abolish existing borders in order to establish an Islamic caliphate? If so, should these two organizations, with little in common save for their Islamism, be viewed as similar for the purposes of the discussion of Islamism? When

one speaks of "violent Islamists," do they intend to group ISIS and Palestine's Hamas into this same group, despite the widely differing contexts for their respective uses of violence? This paper seeks to both identify the current deficits in the conversation of political Islam as well as to propose answers to these questions surrounding the application of the concept of political Islam.

This lack of precision surrounding the discourse on political Islam has negative repercussions on the validity and productiveness of the discussion of Islamist organizations. Fostering a more precise understanding and thus conversation surrounding political Islam is beneficial not only in academic settings, but also in the arena of policymaking. Any discussion of issues related to international relations or domestic policy that intersect with movements of political Islam relies on the ability of scholars or policymakers to have a grasp of the concept as well as how various Islamist actors relate to each another. What does it mean for one to say that Islamist groups are inclined towards violence, if only some groups are violent, and some are decidedly non-violent? What does it mean for one to make claims about the relationship between Islamism and democracy, if Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) has a vastly different relationship to democracy than does Al-Qaeda? In short, statements about the relationship between Islamism and violence, elections, or democracy do not hold much validity when referenced in relation to a broad umbrella of actors. Furthermore, discussions of violence, elections, democracy, and other political phenomena are highly consequential, and it is essential that these discussions are properly oriented. Ennahda, for example, has made an effort to shed the "Islamist" label because the group does not want to be associated in the media with organizations like ISIS (Ounissi, 2017). The lack of precision in important conversations on Islamism has repercussions significant enough to cause one of Tunisia's major political parties to re-orient its strategy in order to shed the fraught and misunderstood label.

I begin this paper by defining the concept of political Islam. I then provide an assessment of the existing discussion surrounding political Islam and identify its deficits and their consequences. I establish the usefulness of a multidimensional typology of Islamist organizations for ameliorating some of the issues associated with the existing means of classifying Islamists. I then lay out three dimensions with which Islamist organizations can be measured and described so as to foster a better understanding of how they relate to each other under the larger umbrella of political Islam. Following the proposal of my own typological framework, I identify types of existing Islamist groups based on how they score within each dimension. I then use a case study of an Islamist organization in order to illustrate how the relationship between an organization and the regime under which it operates can influence an Islamist organization's typology values.

Defining Political Islam

The concept of political Islam, or Islamism, is often used by scholars in discussions of politics in Muslim-majority countries, but the contours of this concept are scarcely defined as a prerequisite to these discussions. Ayoob refers to political Islam as a general ideology or concept that holds "Islam as a body of faith [that] has something important to say about how politics and society should be ordered" (2008, p.2). He then draws on Denoeux's (2002) definition in order to further define the concept of political Islam as "a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups, and organizations that pursue political objectives" (2008, p.2). For the purposes of this essay, I use the latter definition when referring to the concept of political Islam. Definitions similar or identical to that of Ayoob's definition of political Islam or Islamism are common among scholars of Islam and politics (Blaydes and Linzer, 2012; Denoeux, 2002; Hurvitz and Alshech, 2017). Any movement of political Islam from Tunisia's Ennahda to ISIS is

appropriately classified under this definition. The term refers to an increasingly broad range of movements which are not all that similar to each other in regard to their tactics and objectives.

These organizations are primarily—sometimes exclusively—similar in their instrumentalization of the religion of Islam as a political ideology in the pursuit of political objectives. It is precisely for this reason that a typology of movements and organizations of political Islam is necessary. An organization's instrumentalization of Islam could manifest itself in an organization's endeavor to resist an occupation while using nationalist rhetoric and defining its own nation by its relationship to Islam. An Islamist political party might appeal to voters by campaigning on a platform of altering a country's constitution by codifying some elements of their interpretation of sharia law into the document. I define political objectives as any goals held by an entity that seeks to influence or alter the state in some capacity. A non-exhaustive list of political objectives includes the goals of exerting pressure on politicians to achieve a desired outcome, legislating through holding public office, restructuring a regime, maintaining a state's existing borders, or altering states' existing borders.

Organizations that claim Islamic inspiration, though they do not hold political objectives, are examined alongside those whose primary goals involve affecting politics and the state. This former group of organizations seeks to reform Islam, societal norms, or culture in a manner that is commensurate with their interpretations of Islam. However, they do not seek to codify these values by altering their regime or their government's laws. For example, Tablighi Jamaat is an apolitical, international Islamic organization that seeks to reform individual Muslims so that they practice stricter adherence to the religion of Islam. This organization does not hold political objectives; its members do not run for elections, lobby representatives, seek to alter the political

discourse, or intend to change state borders. Thus, they are not appropriately classified or discussed alongside organizations that hold such objectives.

The Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) of Indonesia presents an example of an organization that transitioned from a religious group into a group that makes demands of the state and holds political objectives. The organization was originally a vigilante group that spoke out against and violently opposed some elements of Indonesian society that it viewed as incompatible with Islam, such as the frequenting of liquor stores or nightclubs. Since FPI's culturally oriented inception, the group has recently started to call for the institution of local sharia regulations throughout Indonesia (Arifianto, 2017). In 2013, the group warned voters that supporting candidates in the 2014 elections who do not support instituting sharia law could move Indonesia further down the path of apostasy (Wilson, 2014). Additionally, FPI organized several protests against Jakarta's Christian governor and demanded the politician's resignation while he was on trial for blasphemy (*Al Jazeera*, 2016). FPI is accurately classified as an Islamist organization since the group altered its focus from religious and cultural values to making claims about the relationship between Islam and the Indonesian state. Whereas FPI's commitment to certain cultural values does not make the group Islamist, its commitment to encouraging the state to incorporate these values in its governance is Islamist.

Note that I use the term "Islamism" interchangeably with "political Islam." Using these two terms interchangeably is common in the literature on political Islam, as there is no meaningful difference between them. Mehdi Mozaffari argues that the two terms are not identical in meaning, saying "actually, the latter term is not equivalent to 'Islamism' in Olivier

Roy's terminology. 'Political Islam' designates a failed project in his works, whereas 'Islamism' denominates the new form of activist Islam" (2007, p.19).[1]

The Need for a Typology of Political Islam

There exists a need for a more descriptive typology of the wide range of manifestations of political Islam. As of now, Islamist movements and organizations are often described and categorized based on only one dimension of their multifaceted identities. Existing measures of political Islam too often divide movements of political Islam into binaries. For example, one of these binaries may be defined by those who participate in elections or those who make use of violence in order to achieve their objectives. As a result, Islamist organizations are often placed in groupings based solely on one aspect of their activities, while ignoring other tactics they use to achieve their goals. For example, Schwedler (2011) states that scholars often gravitate towards creating a radical/moderate binary for Islamist organizations, as she cites a number of scholars who do so. The criteria for placing movements within this binary frequently take into account only one of the following tactics: electoral participation or use of violence.

Scholars and policymakers have often grouped together organizations that make use of violence, despite the fact that this common use of violence might be the organizations' only similarity. Former United States Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage designated Hizbullah as the "A-Team" of terrorism in 2003 and argued that Al-Qaeda constituted terrorism's "B-Team" while making remarks about American military targets (Bradley, 2003). Armitage's comment displays an incomplete understanding of the relationship that each of these

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[1]   In a later review of Shadi Hamid and William McCants' 2017 book *Rethinking Political Islam*, Roy uses the two terms interchangeably, explicitly stating that the term "political Islam" is equivalent to Islamism (Roy, 2017). As there is no substantial resistance to the interchangeable nature of the two terms in the literature on political Islam, the term "Islamism" will also be defined as the instrumentalization of Islam for political purposes. Note also that "Islamic" refers to the religion of Islam and does not connote a political instrumentalization of religion. It is the adjectival form of the word "Islam."

organizations has to the larger Middle East. For one to assert that Al-Qaeda is organizationally or ideologically similar to a group such as Hizbullah due to each organization's use of violence is to entirely miss the nuance of Hizbullah's historical position as a resister of occupation (Schwedler, 2011). Whereas Hizbullah uses violence as a means of preserving the Lebanese state and deterring military action from Israel, Al-Qaeda uses violence in the hope of ultimately abolishing state borders and establishing an international caliphate. Hizbullah, a national resistance group, represents a political Islam that is highly distinct from that of Al-Qaeda's, historically a transnational group seeking to re-establish an international caliphate. Although each of these groups uses violence, they also hold dramatically disparate objectives. Frameworks such as these, which elevate the use of violence to the sole identifying trait of Islamist movements, eliminate room for perspective in understanding the widely differing reasons that these two organizations are compelled to use violence.

Similar treatment of diverse organizations based on one facet of their existence also extends to the discussion of organizations that participate in elections. In contrasting the Muslim Brotherhood with Al-Qaeda, Leiken and Brooke (2007) point to the Brotherhood's inclination towards elections versus Al-Qaeda's inclination towards violence. This contrast can be more effectively underscored by a nuanced discussion of historical use of violence as well as each organization's objectives in addition to their attitudes towards elections. Moreover, Islamist organizations are only able to participate in elections in contexts in which the regime allows their participation. Distinguishing among groups solely based on their level of electoral participation may allow one to identify variation in electoral permissiveness of the regimes under which these groups operate, but it does not provide for a thorough classification of the groups themselves. Engaging in comparisons across one dimension, such as electoral participation, could lead to

similar treatment of organizations as diverse as Ennahda, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Hamas. Although all three of these groups participate in elections when able, they operate in widely different contexts and all hold different objectives.

A typology also allows for further description of the concept of political Islam itself, as it describes the ways in which Islamist actors manifest political Islam in their operations. Conceptual typologies elucidate the meaning of a concept by mapping out its dimensions and analyzing them in a systematic manner. This system may take the form of rows and columns in the typology, with distinct types being defined by their cell position within the rows and columns (Collier et al., 2012). A multidimensional typology is most appropriate for mapping out the dimensions of political Islam because Islamist organizations are multifaceted, and any attempt at classifying them based on one dimension obscures the inherent multidimensionality of the one dimension by which they are classified (Collier et al., 2012). A treatment of all Islamist groups as radical is fundamentally reductive and disregards the great variation among Islamist groups. Although one could attempt nuance by classifying Islamist groups as either radical or moderate, this binary classification overlooks the multidimensional nature of the concepts of radicalism and moderation.

A more informed classification seeks to deductively classify groups based on multiple dimensions that are indispensable to describing a political group's operation. The next step is to build types based on these measurements and, using these types as a reference point, inductively argue that some types of Islamist organizations are more disposed towards "radical" or "moderate" behavior than are others. The discussion of which groups are radical and which are moderate is significantly better informed, as they have all been systematically compared to each other across multiple dimensions, rather than being assigned to points on the radical-moderate

continuum. This is a structurally more comprehensive and rigorous process than culling non-complementary traits from Islamist groups (such as the use of violence for one group and electoral participation for another) and concluding that they lie on one end or the other of the radical-moderate continuum. Of course, this is also more methodologically sound than concluding that all Islamist groups are similarly radical due to their usage of political Islam.

In his 2017 book, *Institutional Origins of Islamist Political Mobilization*, Quinn Mecham offers a typology of Islamic movements, which also encompasses organizations I define as Islamist. Mecham's typology remains the only example of a typology of political Islam that I have identified in the literature. His typology is useful for establishing types of Islamic movements, but it is of limited usage with respect to political Islam due to the construction of its dimensions. Mecham's typology features two dimensions: ideology and strategy. The first dimension, ideology, "is the social sphere with which the group's ideology is dominantly engaged" (p.12). This dimension asks the question, does the group focus its attention on promoting individual belief and personal improvement, developing communal religious norms, or on making claims about state behavior? The ideology dimension may be more accurately labelled as the societal "point of engagement" for Islamist actors. The second dimension, strategy, asks does the group pursue its ideology within the framework of the system, or does it move beyond the accepted rules of the system to achieve its goals? Mecham asserts that only groups with statist values on the ideology dimension are examples of political Islam, as his is a typology of Islamic movements and not exclusively Islamist movements. As a result, I will discuss only those organizations whose focus Mecham considers to be statist, as this is the social sphere with which Islamist actors dominantly engage. There are two values within the strategy dimension: accommodative and militant. They intersect with the ideology or point of

engagement dimension to create a total of two Islamist types: political parties and revolutionaries.

Mecham's strategy dimension largely collapses both tactics (which includes electoral participation and use of violence) and objectives into a one-dimensional measure. One could assume that tactics outside of the framework of an actor's current system must be used at some point to achieve goals that are also outside of what is permitted in the current system. As a result, Mecham's strategy dimension necessarily forces groups into the "militant" category if they hold objectives that exist outside the realm of what is permissible in their respective contexts.

Complications with classification arise especially with groups that use militant tactics but do not have revolutionary objectives. For example, Hizbullah does not fit into the category of revolutionary, but the group uses militant tactics and maintains an active military wing, which is primarily used to intervene in conflicts on the side of what Hizbullah determines will preserve the Lebanese state (Hizbullah, 2009). This is evidenced in Hizbullah's forcing Israel to militarily withdraw from southern Lebanon in 2000 and in its counterrevolutionary fight to preserve Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria. Additionally, the group partnered with the Lebanese military to expel Syrian-based, violent Islamist groups from northeast Lebanon (Freedom House, 2018). However, as a result of its use of violence, Hizbullah is grouped alongside revolutionaries, despite the fact that the group has no stated revolutionary ambitions. This typology also complicates the classification of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood's mission is to expand Islam's influence over Egyptian society to the point that it is able to achieve what was initially outside of Egypt's dominant social and political norms, namely, establishing an Islamic state. The Brotherhood maintained the establishment of an Islamic state as its goal even during a period in Egypt when all religious political parties were banned. By any measure, this goal is

undoubtedly outside the realm of what is permitted by the Egyptian regime and thus reflects "militancy" on the part of the Brotherhood. However, the group has a history of being pragmatic and deliberate, most often working within the boundaries and rules that the Egyptian regime determines.

Proposing a Typology

Typologies are useful for further defining concepts as well as applying those concepts to specific cases. Refining the concept of political Islam is the type of analysis that is best served by treatment within a qualitative framework, such as a typology. Ayoob's definition of political Islam, as well as those similar to it, prescribes precise boundaries for the broad concept. Those actors who instrumentalize the religion of Islam as a political ideology toward the end of achieving political objectives are Islamist, and those who do not are not Islamist. However, this definition applies to a myriad of different political actors, many of whom have little to nothing in common with each other except for instrumentalizing Islam as a political ideology and holding political objectives. This makes the concept of political Islam ripe for refinement and clarification through the use of a typology.

Islamist actors exist within widely diverse political environments. As a result, their Islamisms have the potential to be equally distinctive from each other. A typology of political Islam allows for a more precise classification of Islamist organizations that can distinguish among key points of diversity across these organizations. Additionally, a typology is useful in identifying specific types of actors within political Islam as well as the spaces where each of these actors have agency in interacting with regimes. We may find that a specific combination of tactics (comprised of electoral participation and use of violence) used by Islamists often correlates with specific goals. If this is the case, then we can start to discern distinct Islamist

types. We might also find that a specific type of actor is common among certain political environments. Thus, a more nuanced and informed conversation about political Islam and its connection to other political outcomes of interest is fostered.

A typology that takes into account multiple different dimensions provides a clearer picture of political Islam's diversity and allows for nuance in classifying Islamist movements and organizations. With this in mind, I propose a typology of Islamist organizations that separately treats the three dimensions of electoral participation, use of violence, and objectives. The dimension on electoral participation contains values that measure an organization's participation or lack thereof in elections. The use of violence dimension is a binary measure between violence and non-violence. Finally, the objectives axis provides for several values beyond what scholars and media traditionally consider to be Islamist objectives, such as the implementation of sharia law or the establishment of an Islamic state. Rather, I examine the range of political objectives that Islamist organizations maintain and work towards.

Electoral Participation

Electoral participation is a significant tactic that is often used by Islamist organizations, but the tactic itself can often illuminate more about the regime under which an organization operates rather than about the organization itself. In noting which Islamist organizations participate in elections and which do not, I make note of the context in which Islamist groups do or do not participate in elections in order to discern whether or not the group has any demand for participating in competitive elections. For example, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was barred from participating in elections for over three decades. As soon as the group operated under a more accommodating regime, it began to participate in elections again. This pattern of interaction suggests that the Brotherhood had a demand for electoral participation through the

period during which it was banned, but that this demand could not be met until an Egyptian regime allowed it. Assessing a non-electoral group's demand for electoral participation ensures that the typology is able to address the varied contexts in which Islamist movements develop. There are Islamist organizations which variously choose to lobby, endorse political candidates, or proselytize without contesting elections despite their respective regimes allowing them to do so. Additionally, there are Islamist parties that abstain from contesting elections as a means of protest against the ruling regime. This was true in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt when it chose to boycott the 1990 parliamentary elections which it deemed undemocratic (Fahmy, 2016). This is also true in the case of the Jordanian Islamic Action Front, who boycotted the 1997 and 2010 elections in Jordan for similar reasons (Brown, 2012).

Use of Violence

The use of violence dimension considers how an Islamist organization uses this tactic to achieve its political objectives. Thus, the use of violence as a tactic by an Islamist organization is defined as the concerted use of any physical assault undertaken with the intention of furthering the political goals of the Islamist organization.[2] Non-exhaustive examples of physical assault as outlined by Gutierrez-Sanin and Wood (2017) include homicide, torture, displacement, rape, and forced abortion. The incidents of violence must be pre-meditated, tactics endorsed by the organization's leaders, and consistent with the organization's rhetoric and intentions, rather than the actions of one or two fringe individuals within an organization or movement. Violence is also considered an organizational tactic if a significant faction of the organization makes use of it, even if they are not directed to use violence by the organization's leaders.

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[2]   Terrorism is a form of political violence in which some Islamist organizations engage. The concept of terrorism is not clearly defined, and it is beyond the scope of this study to determine which acts of political violence constitute terrorism and which do not.

Objectives

The definition of political Islam does not prescribe any form of instrumentalization of Islam towards specific political objectives. It should be applied evenly to all appropriate movements, as treating political Islam as though only its more "radical" or anti-democratic strains qualify as political Islam makes the term conceptually weak and subject to inconsistent and illogical application. Schwedler (2011) critiques a common practice in the literature of political Islam in which authors express the persistent skepticism surrounding objectives stated by Islamist actors. Often, it seems that the lack of belief in an Islamist group's commitment to democracy is accepted or assumed without further critical consideration. She argues that this assumption necessitates that an entire class of political actors behaves in a way that is contrary to their beliefs and values. It is poor practice to assume organizations often with no governing records and stated commitments to democratic elections are fervently anti-democratic due to an unobservable, ideological peculiarity.

In the place of irresponsible speculation, I intend to substantiate my findings on the objectives dimension using a combination of an organization's stated goals, organizational structure, governing records (if applicable), and engagement with rival political actors. Movements of political Islam espouse objectives that span the range from seeking to merely influence public policy to establishing a caliphate by nullifying existing nation-state structures. This dimension seeks to organize Islamist organizations based on their goals.

At one end of the continuum are organizations that seek to affect policy through legislation. This goal may include lobbying politicians for preferred policies, endorsing politicians or preferred policies, fostering public awareness regarding an important issue via protest or other means, or engendering fear or garnering influence by means of threatening or

perpetrating violent acts. Islamist organizations whose objectives fall under this value seek not to spread Islamist values through holding office but through lobbying and pressuring those who hold office to do so on their behalf. Organizations who seek to affect policy legitimize the state structure by acknowledging that elected officials hold the authority to alter government policy.

Other organizations' goal is to hold political power through being elected to public office, whether that is parliament, the presidency, cabinet positions, or local or regional offices. A group that seeks to enact its agenda through holding power will be classified as such if it attempts to win or succeeds in winning positions in public offices in order to implement policies influenced by its understanding of Islam. Ennahda is an example of an Islamist party that seeks power in public office as well as coalitions in the service of enacting an agenda consistent with its Islamist values (Ayoob, 2014). However, Ennahda has abjured designs to restructure Tunisia's regime, as the party has attempted to position itself as a centrist organization adherent to the national consensus (Hamid, 2016). These organizations also legitimize the state structure by accepting that elected officials have authority in the government.

Other Islamist organizations seek to restructure a regime while maintaining a nation-state structure. This includes the aim to alter the way that the government operates and interacts with the people it governs, while also adhering to the structure of the existing nation-state. The 1979 Iranian Revolution is a typifying example of these objectives by an Islamist movement. As a result of the revolution, the hereditary monarchy was ended, and Shia clerics became state functionaries at the center of considerable political and economic power (Ayoob, 2008). Additionally, the movement resulted in the establishment of the Council of Guardians, which half consists of Shia clerics who review and vet legislation as well as candidates for political office and determine their compatibility with their interpretation of Islam (Ayoob, 2008). These

objectives, now achieved, represent a considerable structural shift from the governance of the former Iranian monarchy. However, the movement recognizes the legitimacy of the existing nation-state structure and has not attempted to alter it.

A number of Islamist organizations seek to restructure the contours of the state. This objective encompasses structural upheaval of the state's governing apparatus and potentially the state's borders as well, as these organizations reject the existing state structure. The objective of Hamas in Palestine is an archetypal example of this value under the goals dimension. Gaza and the West Bank are currently primarily governed by the Palestinian Authority (PA), which is largely toothless and financially dependent on the rival state of Israel (Ayoob, 2014). Hamas envisions a Palestine that is able to pressure Israel into ending its occupation and liberate the Palestinian land (Hamas, 2017). This necessitates a restructuring of the state in such a way that the Palestinian Authority is not dependent on Israel and is able to negotiate outcomes for Palestine that are outside the range of what Israel considers to be immediately acceptable. Additionally, Hamas would have to redraw the existing borders of Palestine and Israel in order to achieve its goal of liberating the Palestinian land.

Finally, a cohort of Islamist groups seeks to restructure the contours of the international system. This objective includes, for the purposes of this typology, the desire to broadly restructure or overhaul the existing nation-state system, as these organizations consider the existing nation-state structures to be illegitimate. ISIS is an example of an Islamist organization that aims to restructure the contours of the international system. More specifically, ISIS intends to nullify existing nation-state borders in order to establish an Islamic State governed by its interpretation of sharia law (Hashim, 2014). ISIS periodically succeeded in this endeavor when it controlled large swaths of territory on both sides of the border of Iraq and Syria. As it relates to

the previous goal of restructuring the contours of the state, this objective entails more than redrawing the boundaries of one or two states. Restructuring the contours of the international system denotes altering multiple state borders as well as the system within which these states interact with each other. This can be accomplished, for example, by establishing an international caliphate.

For the purposes of this typology, the former three objectives are those that indicate the organization accepts the existing state structure, and the latter two objectives indicate that the organization rejects the existing state structure. Objectives that concern pressuring politicians, winning elections, and restructuring regimes do not challenge existing state borders. However, objectives that call for the altering of state borders or the international system inherently reject existing state structures.

Social Services

Although the provision of social services is a common aspect of Islamist organizations, it is excluded from the tactics axis of this typology, as social services provision is not sufficiently distinct from the religion of Islam. Steven Brooke argues in chapter one of the 2017 book *Rethinking Political Islam* that Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood candidates campaigned for political office in part by referencing the organization's history of providing social services, especially medical and education services, to Egyptians. Amr Darrag, an FJP leader, argues that the provision of social services is undertaken towards the end of reinforcing the "notion that these . . . regimes are but a transient, unnatural imposition on the fabric of society rather than having any permanence" (2017, p. 220). In other words, charity is described as both a moral obligation for members of the Islamist movement, but also as a means of transforming the fabric of society. However, the Brotherhood has not required recipients of these services to adhere to

any political or moral values (Brooke, 2017). In other words, the organization historically has

taken steps to make its services apolitical and distinct from that of a political machine that offers

services in exchange for votes. Additionally, it is disingenuous to consider the maintenance of

social services as inherently political, given that charity is a foundational pillar of Islam.

Ultimately, Darrag argues that this service is a form of charity that is required of Muslims who

are able to perform it. As a result, this practice is ultimately more Islamic than it is Islamist, and

it is not considered a political tactic used by movements of political Islam for the purposes of this

typology.

Islamist Types

I have selected cases of prominent Islamist organizations based in a diverse range of

countries from Turkey to Indonesia. Additionally, I examine two instances of Islamist

organizations that operate in multiple countries internationally. Each of these organizations has

had a significant impact on politics in the domestic politics of their origin countries, in their

region, or globally. I classify a total of eight organizations according to my typological

framework. However, I use a total of nineteen cases. Some of these Islamist organizations

represent multiple cases, as their typological values vary over time. This variation is most

commonly present in an organization's tactics (electoral participation and use of violence), but

variation in objectives over time also occurs. Figure 1 plots each of these nineteen observations

onto a single graph with the y-axis representing values on electoral participation and the x-axis

representing values on objectives. The use of violence dimension is represented by the variation

in symbols among the cases. Triangles represent organizations that use violence, and circles

represent organizations that do not use violence. Each of the colors corresponds to a specific

Islamist organization, which are enumerated in the key along with the time period during which each case is examined (Figure 2).

Figure 1 Islamist Types

Three distinct types emerge from this graphic in addition to a fourth type whose properties are not wholly clear. The three distinct types are Islamist national resistance groups, non-violent Islamist political parties, and violent transnational Islamist groups. The fourth type is the vanguard Islamist party.

Figure 2 Islamist Organizations Key to Figure 1

Islamist National Resistance Groups

Islamist national resistance groups maintain active military wings. They participate in elections when they are authorized to do so and when they feel that they have the ability to compete effectively. These groups may either accept or reject existing state structures. Islamist national resistance groups frequently focus on securing their states' borders and coat nationalist ideas in Islamist rhetoric. In the case of Hamas, the group rejects its existing state structure and seeks to restructure the contours of the state. In the case of Hizbullah, the group accepts its existing state structure and seeks to restructure a regime while maintaining a nation-state structure. Muslim Brotherhood 1942-1945 and Muslim Brotherhood 1946-1952 also seek to restructure a regime while maintaining the Egyptian state. The group developed the capability to use violence in 1942 while it was partnered with Nasser's Free Officers Movement. The two groups shared the belief that the British-installed monarchy would have to be ousted via military coup. In fact, one of founder Hasan al-Banna's primary goals was the liberation of Egypt from foreign powers (Munson, 1988).

Each of these groups maintains a constant demand for electoral participation, as evidenced by their participation in elections when permitted to do so by the regime. Hizbullah

participated in Lebanon's first elections in 1992 following the end of the Lebanese Civil War. The organization has a gap in its participation from 2010-2017, a period during which Lebanese parliamentary elections did not take place, primarily due to an influx of refugees and political destabilization caused by the civil war in neighboring Syria. Hizbullah's demand for electoral participation during this time period is evidenced by its participation in Lebanon's 2018 parliamentary elections (Ajroudi, 2018).

Hamas has similarly participated in elections whenever the organization has determined that it has a reasonable ability to campaign and compete. Hamas boycotted the 1996 Palestinian general election in order to protest the Palestinian governmental structure, which it believed was illegitimate and deferential to Israel (Rodgers, 1996). Hamas participated in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, but neither parliamentary nor presidential elections have been held since 2006, and there is no indication that any such elections will be held in the future (Freedom House, 2016). Since the 2006 elections, Hamas and its secular rival Fatah have not reached an agreement as to when elections should be held as well as the elections' terms. The 2010 parliamentary and presidential elections were cancelled as Hamas did not allow participation in Gaza (Reuters, 2009). Hamas also did not allow Gazan participation in local elections in 2012, though local elections were held in the West Bank (Abu Aker and Rudoren, 2012). Although local elections were held in the West Bank in 2017, Hamas charged that the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority decided to initiate voting in the West Bank before a national consensus was reached for how the elections should be conducted (Sawafta and al-Mughrabi, 2017). Hamas's political activity has been severely restricted in the West Bank, and the group has boycotted all local elections held there since 2006. Israel barred Hamas from campaigning in parliamentary

elections in 2006 as well, and its radio and television presences have also been shut down in the West Bank (Freedom House, 2013).

The fledgling Muslim Brotherhood decided to begin participating in elections in 1942. The organization faced significant restrictions and harassment during its campaigning and did not perform well in either the 1942 or 1945 elections (Wickham, 2013). The Brotherhood did not have the opportunity to participate in later elections, as Egypt's Prime Minister formally banned the MB in 1948. As of 1950, the MB was again allowed to operate as a religious organization (Guirguis, 2012). However, the group was not allowed to participate in Egypt's 1950 elections.

Each of the Islamist national resistance groups share the common trait of defending its territory from an external threat to sovereignty. Palestine has been occupied by a foreign actor since Hamas's inception. Hizbullah, founded during the Lebanese Civil War, has had a contentious relationship with Israel since its inception, and the organization branded Israel "an eternal threat" to Lebanon in its 2009 political manifesto. The Muslim Brotherhood 1942-1952 established the aforementioned partnership with Nasser's Free Officer Movements, as both of these groups advocated for the military ousting of the British-installed Egyptian monarchy. Additionally, as of 1936, the Brotherhood dispatched arms and volunteers to Palestine in order to assist Palestinians in their resistance to British occupation. Matesan (2017) argues that the Brotherhood viewed these measures as defensive. The length of this period for classification of the Brotherhood as an Islamist national resistance group extends until 1952, the year of Egypt's bloodless revolution. Following Egypt's liberation from British occupation, the Muslim Brotherhood's primary goal was the establishment of the Islamic state in Egypt, which it remains today (al-Anani, 2016).

Non-violent Islamist Political Parties

Non-violent Islamist political parties do not use violence in order to achieve their political objectives, and they participate in elections when they are authorized to do so. Non-violent Islamist political parties accept their existing state structures. Although all of these groups have demand for electoral participation, a number of these groups are not able to participate in elections. Variation on this dimension reflects a distinction in the structure created by the regime under which the parties operate. The distinction is not determined by the parties themselves.

All non-violent Islamist political parties have a constant demand for electoral participation. The Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party's (PKS) predecessor, the Justice Party, was founded in 1998. The party has participated in elections since 1999, the first year that it was eligible (Thompson, 1999). Similarly, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkey was founded in 2001, and the party has participated in elections since its first year of eligibility in 2002 (*Economist*, 2002).

Ennahda 1981-2010, Ennahda 2011-2018, Muslim Brotherhood 1973-1983, and Muslim Brotherhood 1984-2014 have demonstrated demand for participation in elections. Founded as the Islamic Tendency Movement in 1981, the party changed its name to Ennahda in 1989. Throughout Ennahda's early years, it was barred from elections by the Tunisian Ben Ali regime. Some Ennahda members participated in the 1989 elections as independents, but they did not win any seats. Ennahda was no longer banned in Tunisia following the 2011 ousting of President Ben Ali. Ennahda participated in the 2011 elections and has continued to participate in elections since then (*Al Jazeera*, 2011). The Muslim Brotherhood formally renounced violence in the late 1970s, but the group had not been implicated in any incidents of violence since 1972 (Guirguis, 2012).

As a result of this shift to non-violence, the organization moves from the vanguard Islamist party type into a non-violent Islamist political party. The Brotherhood had a demand for electoral participation since well before 1973, and this remains constant in its new iteration as a non-violent Islamist political party. This is evidenced by its participation in elections as soon as the nascent Mubarak regime allowed it in 1984. The Brotherhood also participated in every subsequent Egyptian election until it was banned following President Morsi's ouster in 2013. The lone exception is the 1990 election, which the party boycotted, stating that it was not "free and fair" enough (Wickham, 2013, p.56).

Non-violent Islamist political parties have vary some in objectives, but all of their objectives indicate acceptance of the existing state structures in which they operate. The PKS seeks to get elected in order to make Islam a prominent ideological source of governance in Indonesia (Nisa, 2018). The AKP has dominated Turkish politics since its inception, and it has used its power to transform the constitutionally secular government into a more religious and conservative state (*Al Jazeera*, 2018). The AKP has not advocated for the restructuring of Turkish borders or the international system. Ennahda declares its main purpose to be the maintenance of democracy and religious freedom in Tunisia, as the party has branded itself as "Muslim democrats." The party's actions are consistent with these statements, as Ennahda has been willing to enter into a governing coalition with rival secular parties (Ghannouchi, 2016). Ennahda was formerly at odds with the Ben Ali regime and likely supportive of its ending. The Muslim Brotherhood states that its primary goal is "the introduction of the Islamic Shari'a as the basis controlling the affairs of state and society" (IkhwanWeb, 2010). Although the Brotherhood has also made claims regarding the establishment of an international caliphate, the party has not taken any tangible steps towards this goal. The Brotherhood is primarily, if not exclusively,

focused on Egyptian domestic politics, and it has limited and insignificant ties to Muslim

Brotherhood chapters in other countries, which operate independently of the Egyptian branch.

Violent Transnational Islamist Groups

Violent transnational Islamist groups use violence in order to achieve their objectives,

and they do not participate in elections. Furthermore, they do not have any demand for

participation in elections. These groups also reject existing state structures. Both groups

classified under this type hold the objective of restructuring the international system. Al-Qaeda's

primary objective is to create an Islamic state modeled after the medieval caliphate, governed by

sharia law, and encompassing all current and former majority-Muslim countries (Mendelsohn,

2016). ISIS seeks to nullify existing borders in the Middle East and establish a Sunni Islamist

state governed by its strict interpretation of sharia en route to becoming the foremost political

and religious authority for Muslims internationally (Cronin, 2015). Neither of these

organizations have participated in elections, despite the fact that Iraq has allowed for electoral

competition in recent years.

Al-Qaeda has used violence largely to attack the "far enemy", the United States, with the

goal of weakening the country to the point that it no longer assists in sustaining secular regimes

in Muslim-majority countries. Furthermore, Al-Qaeda has perpetrated attacks against secular

regimes in the Middle East. The organization has attacked politicians, security forces, and

civilians, in Iraq (Freedom House, 2012). Al-Qaeda has also claimed responsibility for attacks on

religious targets, such as a Catholic church in Baghdad (*Al Jazeera*, 2010).

ISIS has used violence in order to display its own power and assert its desire for

supremacy over the West and its secular institutions. ISIS's multiple on-camera beheadings were

constructed as global spectacles primarily intended to garner the attention of distant Western

audiences. ISIS's executions were intended as a performance that reflects the group's desired political reality, supremacy of their interpretation of Islam over the West and Western institutions (Friis, 2017). ISIS's filmed beheadings and spectacular terrorist attacks profoundly affected fear of terrorism and public perception of the organization in polities as far away as the United States. Following a 2015 bombing in Paris, 63 percent of Americans polled expressed fear that an attack similar to the one in Paris could happen near them (Reuters, 2015). By 2016, 71 percent of Americans believed that acts of terrorism were either very likely or somewhat likely to occur in the United States over the next several weeks (CNN, 2016).

ISIS also used violence in order to capture territory and govern the areas which it captured. During the height of ISIS's strength, one of the group's main sources of funding was the sale of oil acquired from fields within its conquered territories. By 2014, ISIS was estimated to have been selling as many as 70,000 barrels of oil per day, totaling their daily income between $1 million and $3 million (Lister, 2015). Additionally, ISIS's monopoly on violence in western Iraq and eastern Syria allowed the group to collect commercial taxes as well as taxes on non-Muslim residents. These taxes comprised the majority of funds that ISIS used to build its social services infrastructure within the territory it governed (Krause, 2018). Finally, ISIS used violence within its own territory in order to maintain its borders and enforce adherence to its legal code. ISIS claimed that it largely eliminated corruption and kidnappings within its borders as a result of its adopting sharia and the brutal punishments the group used to enforce it. In other words, ISIS used significant violence within its territory in order to deter crime and establish its legitimacy as a governing entity (Krause, 2018).

Vanguard Islamist Parties

The vanguard Islamist party is the fourth type of Islamist organization that I have identified. Vanguard Islamist parties have a demand for participation in elections, but the regime has banned them from doing so. These groups use violence and accept the existing state structure. These parties are in the mold of Vladimir Lenin's vanguard party, which seeks to alter political systems so that its ideology and objectives may ultimately be realized on a national scale. I determine that this type does not constitute a fully-formed or coherent Islamist type because the only examples of its existence are during two transitional phases of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's history, 1953-1972 and 2014-2018. Each of these phases takes place during severe repression of the organization by the Egyptian regime. Furthermore, each of these phases of the Brotherhood's history are characterized by divisions within the organization, making them difficult to study and to determine their values across the three typology dimensions. Additionally, these structural changes in the organization are induced as a result of regime intervention, making this type of Islamist group more a function of context and regime than of the actor's agency. These organizations seek to ultimately become non-violent electoral participants, but existing political dynamics do not allow the organization to make use of non-violence and electoral participation.

Since the Muslim Brotherhood's inception, Hassan al-Banna and his successors have emphasized the importance of the mass-based, grassroots element of the organization. The Brotherhood pursues change by restructuring individuals' identities as a necessary step on the way to reshaping societal norms and values (al-Anani, 2016). Vladimir Lenin, in formulating his vision for a vanguard party that creates the necessary conditions for revolution, states that "working class consciousness cannot be genuine political consciousness unless the workers are trained to respond to all cases . . . of abuse" as well as trained to respond from the party's desired

perspective (Lenin, 1975, p.42). Similarly, the Brotherhood encourages its members to respond to modern grievances by identifying segments of society and the state where Islam can be installed as the solution. Al-Banna and Lenin make similar claims about the need to alter how individuals respond to certain stimuli in order to lay the groundwork for a revolutionary movement. Al-Banna emphasized the importance of disseminating the Brotherhood's ideology, recruiting supporters, and building the movement as necessary pre-requisites for establishing an Islamic State (al-Anani, 2016). Similarly, Lenin wrote that his Social-Democrats must bring political knowledge to the workers by going "among all classes of the population" (Lenin, 1975, p.50). Lenin's call to waking the class consciousness of the entire population is reminiscent of al-Banna's call to spread the Brotherhood's ideas to Egypt's Muslims through proselytizing and social welfare networks in the pursuit of more members (al-Anani, 2016).

Since 2014, the Muslim Brotherhood has not participated in elections. However, it is unclear whether or not the organization is using violence or if the Brotherhood's leadership sanctions the use of violence by the group's members. An increasingly distinct faction of the Brotherhood has made frequent use of non-lethal violence, creating an even more confrontational relationship between the Brotherhood and the state (Awad & Hashem, 2015). Pahwa argues that this rupture is great enough to signify "the end of a unified movement confronting the single target of the Egyptian state that had prevailed for forty years" (2015, p. 1079). As a result, it may be increasingly appropriate to refer to the Brotherhood as two or more movements. However, it is not yet totally clear where to draw the distinction between these factions.

Unobserved Islamist Types

I have not identified a case in which an organization that rejects state structures does not use violence, regardless of whether or not they participate in elections. In other words, every

organization that I have identified as rejecting state structures uses violence as a tactic to achieve its goals. I expect that this is because organizations who reject existing state structures aim ultimately to either alter the borders of their own state (thus, necessarily altering the borders of another state or states) or to restructure the international system (which likely entails altering the borders of several states).

In the cases of ISIS and Al-Qaeda, these groups seek to nullify existing state borders in order to establish an international caliphate. Using elections to accomplish this task would require an international electoral movement predicated on referenda that stipulate the abolition of existing borders and establishment of a caliphate. Reaching the objective of establishing an international caliphate through the use of elections is highly unlikely or impossible. Not only does it require a sustained international electoral movement, but it also requires that global and regional powers outside of the proposed caliphate do not intend to interfere to defeat the initiative. The use of violence towards the end of forcibly altering state borders is the more pragmatic approach to achieving this objective. ISIS succeeded in conquering and governing territory on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border through its use of violence.

Similarly, Hamas has maintained an active military wing since the group's inception. Hamas has also maintained the goal of establishing a sovereign state comprised of the existing Palestinian territories and ending the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Hamas prefers that the entire territory of Israel be incorporated into a Palestinian state, but Ayoob (2014) states that there may be conditions under which Hamas would accept the establishment of a second state based on the 1967 borders between Palestine and Israel (Ayoob, 2014). Either goal necessitates the reconstruction of the Palestine-Israel border. No significant political coalition exists within Israel that would be willing to either nullify its own state or diminish its existing borders. Thus,

Hamas maintains a military wing in order to achieve its long-term goal of altering these borders. In the short term, Hamas's military wing serves as a deterrent against further Israeli encroachment in the Palestinian territories.

Movement among Typology Values: The Muslim Brotherhood as a Case Study

Detailing how Islamist organizations' typology values shift can be illustrative in determining the significance of the relationship between an organization and a country's regime. This relationship is particularly significant in the way that it impacts the tactics, such as electoral participation and use of violence, that the organization chooses or that are available to the organization to use. Change in the organization-regime relationship can affect the organization's objectives as well. The regime largely creates the context within which the organization operates, and an Islamist organization adopts combinations of tactics and objectives in response to this context.

The early Muslim Brotherhood's decision to begin participating in elections reflects a change in the organization's tactics. However, its inability to participate following the 1945 elections was a result of a regime that did not permit its electoral participation. Regarding the Brotherhood's nascent electoral participation, I have not found evidence that the Brotherhood was banned from electoral competition before 1942. Rather, 1942 was the year that the group voted and decided that electoral participation was a tactic that was compatible with its mission (Wickham, 2013). Following electoral failures and government harassment, Egypt's Prime Minister formally banned the Brotherhood in 1948. As of 1950, the Brotherhood was again allowed to operate as a religious organization (Guirguis, 2012). However, the group was not allowed to participate in Egypt's 1950 elections.

The Brotherhood began to use violence domestically in 1942 as a result of its partnership with Nasser's Free Officers Movement, as both groups worked towards the goal of toppling the country's British-installed monarchy. The two groups agreed that a military coup would be necessary to oust the monarchy (Guirguis, 2012). Hasan Al-Banna stated that the Muslim Brotherhood had two basic goals: "That the Islamic nation [*watan*] be liberated from all foreign powers" and "that there arise in this free nation a free Islamic state that will function according to the rules of Islam" (cited in Munson, 1988, p.76-77). Egypt was liberated from British occupation in 1952, but the Brotherhood maintained its violent apparatus.

The Muslim Brotherhood may have maintained violent capabilities because it calculated that the incoming military regime would prolong the group's marginalized position established under the former monarchical regime. In other words, the organization opted to maintain its ability to use violence because it expected the incoming president to exclude the group from the political process. Alternatively, it is possible that the Brotherhood never intended to continue its practice of violently targeting domestic entities. Matesan (2017) uses the Muslim Brotherhood as a case study to argue that the formation of an armed wing can lead to the militarization of an entire organization because the use of violence is inherently "sticky," or difficult to end as an organizational tactic once it has been implemented. Ultimately, the Brotherhood may have maintained its violent apparatus because it distrusted Nasser, a president who made it a priority to repress the organization during his time in power.

Gamal Abdel Nasser (president 1954-1970) presided over the most severe crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood that Egypt has seen. In January 1954, Nasser issued a decree that dissolved the Brotherhood. This decree caused the Brotherhood to fortify its secret apparatus in preparation for "what it saw as an inevitable confrontation with the regime" (Wickham, 2013,

p.27). The Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nasser in October of 1954. Following this, the organization was institutionally crushed for years. The Brotherhood conspired to blow up major targets and assassinated government officials in 1964 (Guirguis, 2012). The Brotherhood considered this escalated violence to be a direct response to Nasser's order that the organization be dissolved. The organization, in this case, maintained the use of violence as a tactic in response to the structure created by the regime. The Brotherhood had no other open path for political participation or organizational survival other than the use of violence.

Additionally, I argue that Hassan al-Banna's assassination in 1949 as well as Nasser's repression of the Brotherhood diminished the group's unity and its leadership's ability to enforce strategy and norms among the group's members. Militant factions within the organization had outsized influence during this period of exile, imprisonment, torture, and death. New divisions were created within the Brotherhood's organization, including those led by Sayyid Qutb who were more inclined towards using violence against the regime. The division was starkest between the Qutbist faction of the Brotherhood and the group's dominant faction, represented by General Guide Hassan al-Hudaybi and other senior Brotherhood leaders. The latter faction provided a theological justification for the Brotherhood's gradualist approach to the Islamic reform of Egyptian society (Wickham, 2013).

The group's strategic shift to non-violence was prompted by the presence of a more accommodating president in Anwar Sadat (1970-1981). Sadat dismantled Nasser's domestic intelligence apparatus, freed Muslim brothers from prison, and allowed the Brotherhood to function politically (Guirguis, 2012). These reforms allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to become a more coherent entity with significantly lower risk of its members being killed, jailed, or exiled. As a result, Brotherhood leadership may have had more influence over the group's membership,

allowing them the capacity to prevent the organizational use of violence, thereby "un-sticking" it from the Brotherhood. Ultimately, it may have been an internal shift within the Muslim Brotherhood which was prompted by a structural shift of the Egyptian regime that allowed the group to operate more freely.

The Muslim Brotherhood again participated in elections in 1984 and did so until 2013. The Brotherhood's participation in elections reflects a shift in the structure within which it worked, as formulated by the Egyptian regime. That is, the Brotherhood likely would have been open to participating in elections at some time before this, but it only did so at this time because the nascent Hosni Mubarak regime (1981-2011) allowed it. By the 2011 fall of the Mubarak regime and 2012 election, the Brotherhood was able to participate more fully in Egyptian elections. As a result, Mohamed Morsi won the presidency and governed for a year before being ousted in a military coup.

Since 2014, the Muslim Brotherhood has not participated in elections. This change in tactics reflects a change in the structure within which the Brotherhood operates, as the group would participate in elections if it were given the option to do so. As I previously discussed, it is unclear the extent to which Brotherhood members are using violence, and it is unclear whether or not the Brotherhood's leadership sanctions the use of violence by the group's members. The violence that has been perpetrated by Brotherhood members has been non-lethal, as they primarily target infrastructure (Awad & Hashem, 2015). This period in the Brotherhood's history is reminiscent of its time under President Nasser, given the imprisoned Brotherhood leadership as well as a high number of members who have been imprisoned, exiled, or killed. As a result of the uncertainty surrounding the organization and its leadership, it may be more appropriate to consider the Brotherhood as two or more distinct movements. Although this division and

uncertainty has occurred within the organization, it is due to the repression that the Brotherhood

has faced from the regime. The present incoherence of the Muslim Brotherhood is the result of a

response to the structure and context created by the Egyptian regime.

Figure 3 – Muslim Brotherhood Type Movement

The type of Islamist organization that develops in a given political context is largely a

result of the forces within that context that shape the organization. This is especially true as it

relates to an Islamist organization's tactics. The Muslim Brotherhood has been engaged in a

complex dance with Egyptian regimes for the better part of eight decades. The organization

constantly shifts its values on the dimensions of electoral participation and use of violence in the

hope of striking a sustainable balance of political efficacy and confrontation with the existing

regime. As a result, the Brotherhood has operated as multiple different types of Islamist

organizations over time (see Figure 3). However, the organization has remained committed to the

same objectives over this extended period of time. This reflects that the actor has more agency in

determining its objectives than its tactics, which are often affected or constrained by the regime's policy.

Conclusion

The existing literature on political Islam has fallen short with respect to the classification of Islamist organizations. Existing means of differentiating Islamist groups often center on one facet of organizational traits. For example, authors can be intent on labelling a given group of violent Islamist actors as terrorists and another, non-violent Islamist group as moderates. However, the use of violence as a political tactic does not denote terrorism, and the lack of violence does not necessarily denote moderation. When Islamist organizations are fitted into unidimensional binaries, significant analytical nuance is often lost, and dissimilar organizations are grouped together. This is particularly true in the case of political Islam because the concept encompasses such an expansive range of political actors.

I have proposed a multidimensional typology to alleviate the classification of highly dissimilar Islamist groups into the same categories as each other. The separate dimensions consist of electoral participation, use of violence, and objectives. Analyzing organizations across these three dimensions yields a total of three distinct Islamist types and a fourth type that is potentially a transitional phase for Islamist organizations. The Islamist national resistance type is broadly characterized as a group that uses violence and participates in elections when able. These organizations may or may not reject existing state structures. All groups that share this type also share a resistance to an external threat to state sovereignty. The non-violent Islamist political party type is characterized by groups that are non-violent, have a demand for electoral participation, and hold objectives that do not challenge their existing state structures. The violent transnational Islamist type consists of organizations that use violence, do not have a demand for

electoral participation, and whose objectives challenge existing state structures. The fourth type, the vanguard Islamist party, is violent, demands electoral participation, and accepts existing state structures. These organizations seek to move into the non-violent Islamist political party group.

A closer examination of the Muslim Brotherhood illustrates how Islamist groups can move among typology dimension values and thus into different types throughout their histories. For the Brotherhood, this movement among the electoral participation and use of violence values is caused by its complex and often confrontational relationship with the Egyptian regime. This case study makes clear that an organization's participation in elections or lack thereof is often determined by the desires of the regime and not of the organization itself. Thus, making distinctions among Islamists solely based on their electoral participation reveals more about the regimes under which they operate than about the agencies and the wishes of the Islamist organizations. An Islamist group's use of violence is also often a product of its contexts' political forces. For example, I find that organizations who operate in territories with external threats to sovereignty often develop armed wings and military capabilities. The case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood gives credence to the idea that Islamist organizations have more agency in determining their own objectives, as the Brotherhood's primary objective of establishing an Islamic state in Egypt has not wavered despite decades of organizational tumult and transformation.

The formulation of a multidimensional typology and establishment of distinct Islamist types can aid in focusing the discussion of political Islam. Rather than haphazardly labelling Islamist organizations as "radical" or "moderate" based on a single dimension, this multidimensional typology provides a more nuanced understanding of the diversity of political Islam and Islamist organizations. A more complete understanding of this diversity can inform the

myriad academic and policymaking discussions on political Islam and its relationship to

elections, democracy, and violence.

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ela_Islam_and_Indonesia%27s_2014_Elections

Appendix

Islamist National Resistance Groups	Non-Violent Islamist Political Parties	Violent Transnational Islamist Groups	Islamist Vanguard Parties
Hamas (1987-2005) Hamas (2006) Hamas (2007-2018) Hizbullah (1987-1991) Hizbullah (1992-2009) Hizbullah (2010-2017) Hizbullah (2018) Muslim Brotherhood (1942-1945) Muslim Brotherhood (1946-1952)	Ennahda (1981-2010) Ennahda (2011-2018) Justice and Development Party (AKP) (2001-2018) Muslim Brotherhood (1973-1983) Muslim Brotherhood (1984-2013) Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) 1998-2018	Al-Qaeda (1988-2018) Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) (1999-2018)	Muslim Brotherhood (1953-1972) Muslim Brotherhood (2014-2018)