This paper addresses implicit bargaining power within employment relationships.
creator
Ferguson, William D. (Class of 1975) (Faculty/Staff)
Title
Fair Wages, Worker Motivation and Implicit Bargaining Power in Segmented Labor Markets
supporting host
Grinnell College. Economics
Index Date
2005
Date Issued
01-Mar-2005
Date (Other)
2005-03
Publisher
Grinnell College
Genre
Essays
Digital Origin
born digital
Extent
29 pages
Media Type
application/pdf
description
This paper addresses implicit bargaining power within employment relationships using a versatile model of labor market segmentation that combines labor discipline, performance pay, insider power, and fair wage principles. In the primary sector, fair wage comparisons, firm-specific human capital, and less perfect monitoring engender bilateral bargaining power, yielding high compensation, sometimes including a bonus. Secondary-sector employers exert unilateral bargaining power, via credible dismissal threats with no replacement costs, and offer no bonuses. Differential determinates of implicit bargaining power can potentially explain various phenomena, including nominal wage rigidity, union wage differentials, job-specific wage differentials, and gender or race-based wage differentials.
Note
Ferguson, William D. (2005) "Fair Wages, Worker Motivation, and Implicit Bargaining Power in Segmented Labor Markets" Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift f+?r die gesamte Staatswissenschaft Vol. 161, No. 1, pp. 126-154.
Language
English
Topic
Employee motivation
Topic
Wages
Topic
Collective bargaining
Classification
HB
Related Item
Faculty Scholarship
Related Item
Scholarship at Grinnell
Related Item
Digital Grinnell
Identifier (hdl)
http://hdl.handle.net/11084/11682
Identifier (local)
grinnell:11682
Access Condition
Copyright to this work is held by the author(s), in accordance with United States copyright law (USC 17). Readers of this work have certain rights as defined by the law, including but not limited to fair use (17 USC 107 et seq.).
